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Abstract
This thesis examines the form of reconstruction intervention known as 'nation building',
through a case study of the United Nations led operation in East Timor that began in 1999. It
examines how the idea of the nation and statehood first arose, and how these ideals are still
prevalent in modern nation building interventions. The thesis also examines the weaknesses
and ambiguities that have become associated with nation building, and how such weaknesses
have found a common thread through subsequent interventions

The thesis then uses the case study of the intervention in East Timor, dividing the operation in
to three stages; the initial stabilising operation, the institution building phase, and the final
withdrawal in 2002. The examination of these phases forms the central focus of the thesis, as
such an assessment provides insight into the various challenges that accompany such
operations. The thesis assesses the success of these different phases, and from this provides
findings that give insight the causes behind the crisis of governance that arose within East
Timor during 2006. From this the thesis will provide limited findings on what areas such
interventions face particular challenges, and on the overall viability of nation building as a
solution to state failure.
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GLOSSARY

CNRT: National Council of Timorese Resistance. Pro-independence group that, though not a sovereign
government, enjoyed considerable de facto legitimacy both before and during the UNTAET
intervention.
UNAMET: United Nation Mission in East Timor. The UN mission to Timor that existed from May 5
Agreements in 1999 to the intervention of UNTAET later that year.
INTERFET: INTERnational Force East Timor. A multinational peacekeeping taskforce mandated by the
United Nations to address the humanitarian and security crisis which took place in East Timor from

1999-2000 until the arrival of United Nations peacekeepers.
NC: National Council. Thirty-three-member council that was formed in 2000 out of the initial NCC.
Included many members of original council, but expanded to include student, women's and church
groups.
NCC: National Consultative Council. Fifteen-member council that was formed under UNTAET as a
successor to the CNRT, being made up almost exclusively by former members of the initial council.
S/2001/423: Such a form of reference is the code of a UN Report, or report of the Secretary-General.
TNI: Tentara Nasional Indonesia. Indonesian title for the Indonesian Armed Forces.
UN: The United Nations. An international organization that aims at facilitating co-operation in
international law, international security, economic development, and social equity.
UNMISET: United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor. The successor mission to UNTAET, its
mandate expired on 20th May 2005.
UNTAET: The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor. The official title for the nation
building operation that existed in East Timor between 1999 and 2002.
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INTRODUCTION

As of mid-2006, the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste functions only at the most
basic of levels. The ruling Fretilin Party remains incapable of governing the state as
tension between ethnic groups within the government and military led to bitter infighting
and civil unrest resulting in the intervention of an Australian-led multinational
peacekeeping force in May 2006. This intervention represented the lowest point of a
crisis of confidence in governance. Such confidence had been steadily declining in the
early part of this year.

Such a scenario would have been inconceivable to international observers only a short
time ago. In mid-2005 the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET)
began a final withdrawal of its resources that was to take approximately 12 months'. This
withdrawal was built upon the positive reports by both UNMISET and several other
parties such as East Timorese Government, other external nation states that were
involved including Australia and Portugal, as well as the increasing optimism of the East
Timorese people (UNMISET, 2005; Heffernan, B, & Adams, D, & Cunningham, A, &
Lindsay, P, 2003). Indeed, even as late as 2005, East Timor continued to be perceived as
an example of a successful nation building operation (Dobbins, 2005) 2 .

Before the 30th of August 1999, the issue of East Timor had remained unresolved for the
international community (Gorjao, 2001, p.101 ). After several centuries of colonial rule,
UNMISET replaced UNTAET after the Timorese independence in 2002.
See "Security Council Resolution 1599" in appendix for an example of the optimism the U.N. held for
Timor as of May 2005.
1
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the Portuguese left the people of East Timor to determine their own fate on the 28th of
November 1975. This independence lasted nine days with the Indonesian army invading
the fledgling state claiming that the ruling Fretilin regime had communist links (Lawless,
1976, pp. 950-951). The USA, the major western power in the region at this time, was
finally withdrawing itself from a lengthy and costly intervention into communist
Vietnam. Fearing that its failure in Indo-China had brought about a domino-like effect in
Asia that would see the rise of communist regimes throughout the region, the USA and its
major regional ally in Australia were content to let the pro-western regime that ruled
Indonesia retain control of East Tim or. This occupation would last for almost 25 years
(Dobbins, 2005, p.151).

The end of the Cold War, the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, and regime change in
Indonesia were all factors creating an atmosphere in which the status of East Tim or could
finally be addressed (Dobbins, 2005, pp.151-152). Indonesia's new President Jusuf
Habibie acceded to letting the population of East Timor hold a referendum on August 30
1999 to vote on whether to allow the East Timorese increased autonomy under the
umbrella of Indonesian rule. While this was therefore not strictly a vote on independence,
it was made clear to all parties by the United Nations that if the East Timorese rejected
the proposed autonomy in the referendum by a large enough majority, that would suffice
to force a process of full independence from Indonesia to take place.

The East Timorese rejected autonomy under Indonesia by a majority of almost 80 per
cent, a result that would require the Indonesian government to allow the UN to forge
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ahead with the process to achieve formal independence for the people of East Timar
(Country Strategy Paper: East Timar, 2001, p.1; Dobbins, 2005, pp. 151-153; Gorjao,
2002, pp.313-314). The aftermath of this referendum result is the point at which the
thesis will begin its examination of East Timor and the UNTAET operation.

Thus, the initial intention when choosing nation building in East Timar as a thesis topic
was to examine how the UN and its agencies had undertaken such a highly complex
intervention in such a short period of time, and to provide an overarching understanding
of what such an operation actually involves. Even before the violence that erupted in May
and June 2006, previous research had suggested that the UN reports and press releases on
East Timar could potentially be seen as misleading; independent assessments from
research centres such as RAND and Global Policy Forum, alongside literature produced
by former UNTAET staffers were far less optimistic. 3 Yet even these opposing views did
little to blunt the shock that accompanied the realisation that this fledgling state had so
quickly devolved into violence. It was in this context that the aim of this thesis turned to
examine the increasingly apparent deficiencies in the Timorese operation, as well as the
effectiveness of nation building as a viable form ofreconstruction in such instances.

The issue to be addressed within this thesis, therefore, is how to explain the failure of
nation building in East Timar. In an attempt to address.such issues, the thesis will focus
on several research questions:
Compare reports such as those promoted by UNTAET and other UN organisations
against literature authored by those critical of the intervention such as Chopra,
Goldstone, Smith, Steele, Philpott, and also recent press reports of the unrest in Timor.

3
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1.

What is nation building? How has it developed?

2. How did the consecutive UN-led operations in Timor go about stabilizing the
situation within Timor after the violence that followed the 1999 referendum?
3. How successful was the operation to rebuild Timor's institutions in the short and
long term?
4. Why did UNTAET's mandate end prematurely, leaving Timor with unresolved
ethnic and political tensions?

4

Methodology

This thesis adopts a case study approach to the problem of understanding nation building.
A case study can be defined as "an in-depth, multifaceted investigation, using qualitative
research methods, of a single social phenomenon", where this phenomenon is seen "as
part of a larger set of parallel instances" (Feagin, Orum & Sjoberg, 1991, p.2). Robert
Yin (2003, p.l) writes that "case studies are the preferred strategy when ... the
investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary
phenomenon with some real-life context", and so the case study of East Timor is
approached as such in this thesis.

Case studies have been criticised for their lack of quantitative analysis. However, when
examining the topic of nation building it became apparent that a purely quantitative study
would fail to adequately provide insight into the unique circumstances that can vary
greatly between different nation building interventions (Feagin, et al, 1991, p.1). A case
study permits the thesis to examine the operation in East Timor within the broad structure
of a nation building operation, while still letting the thesis make allowances for
circumstance that are unique to the Timorese experience.

Using the intervention in East Timor as a strategy for approaching the topic is
appropriate, as the intervention was recently concluded and there was sufficient
documentation to support such a study, allowing a thorough examination of nation
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building interventions as a whole (Babbie, 2005, p. 306). However, having approached
this thesis without prior knowledge of the crisis of 2006, and having had to move from a
historical examination to one that has contemporary elements has forced a change of
focus. While sufficient literature exists on the Timor intervention and the country's
independence through to 2004/2005, there is a lack of scholarly examination of the events
and causes of the crisis in 2006. The thesis has therefore altered its focus to using an
analysis of the documentation and literature written both during and directly after the
intervention and subsequent independence, in order to determine whether the events of
2006 could have been foreseen.

Despite the fact that the direction of this thesis has been altered by the recent events in
East Timor, a case study remains the most appropriate form of examination for assessing
the viability of nation building operations, as the seemingly rapid transition from a
functional democracy to a situation of lawlessness and violence raises serious issues
within the nation building process that can be addressed at length within the Timorese
operation. However, it is also important to outline how such reconstructions are
approached by prospective nation builders, and how nation building has come to be
viewed and defined.

The concept of nation building will form its own chapter, devoted to examining how
reconstruction and development projects have advanced. However, this section will
outline initially what methodology this thesis will use to examine nation building, both as
a method ofreconstruction and within the context of East Tim or. At first glance, nation
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building appears to be a consistent and stable theory, which addresses the processes that
should be followed to bring a weak or failing state through a series of stabilisation and
reconstruction programs towards self-sustainment. James Dobbins (2003) and his team at
the RAND institute define nation building as "the use of armed force in the aftermath of a
conflict to underpin an enduring transition to democracy". This definition is inherently
vague because nation building operations can vary greatly in their characteristics.
Fukuyama provides a definition of greater complexity; however, it is also narrower in
scope.

Initially, suggests Fukuyama (2004, pp.1-3), the nation-state must be stabilised, usually
involving the deployment of troops from external powers, often made up of a union of
surrounding or concerned states. Following the successful stabilisation of the "client
state", a process of reconstruction will begin, rebuilding institutions such as the
government and treasury, military and police forces, hospitals and welfare centres, and
other establishments deemed integral to the functionality of the nation state (Fukuyama,
2004, pp.1-2).

While Dobbins and Fukuyama are generally accepted as the leading experts in this field,
they fail to outline how and when an exit strategy should be developed and implemented
to return sovereignty to the citizens of the "client state". 4 When examining the case of the
UN-led nation building intervention in East Timor, it became apparent that the drive to
See such debates as "A Brookings Briefing: The US and UN Roles in Nation Building: A
Comparative Analysis" for examples of both Dobbins and Fukuyama debating nation
building topics (and as evidence of their eminent position within the field). Also
Fukuyama does make reference to a withdrawal from an intervention, but implies that it
is a result of the two initial phases rather than an independent phase itself.

4
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quickly return sovereignty and engage in a withdrawal from Timor was a central aim of
the intervention, and also became one of its most difficult and complex phases. This is
highlighted when both current and previous nation building interventions are also
examined. 5 The ability to execute a viable withdrawal from an intervention is therefore
integral to carrying out a successful nation building intervention, and this forms a key
question for this thesis.

Despite flaws in the approach to, and conceptualisation of, nation building this thesis will
use the criteria from both Dobbins and Fukuyama to develop a methodology that will be
used to examine the nation building operation in East Timor. This methodology will also
include the withdrawal from an intervention as a separate phase, despite the fact that
Dobbins and Fukuyama have generally overlooked this process. This is because of the
importance that this thesis places on the UNTAET's withdrawal from East Timor, with
an emphasis on the political, social and economic situations that the UN left Timor in
upon its exit.

The thesis will also examine a series of UN reports that date from 1999 through to 2005
that include both reports by the various missions (UNTAET, UNMISET) on behalf of the
Secretary-General, and resolutions by the UN Security Council that detail decisions made
by the UN in regards to East Timor. In total there are 22 reports that were published on
behalf of the Secretary-General during this time, alongside 17 resolutions decided upon
by the Security Council. An examination of these reports highlights a tendency towards
s The interventions in Bosnia and Iraq have both suffered from the intervening forces
becoming bogged down in low grade, yet long term, conflicts that prevent any viable
exit strategy.
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positive conclusions that bear little resemblance to the actual situation in Timor, details of
which are often inconsistently included within the same reports. The examination of such
reports, in conjunction with the assessments drawn from other literature, will form a
major focus of the case study of East Timor within the latter half of this paper.

9

Significance

Nation building has developed significantly since its inception during the reconstruction
operations in Germany and Japan following the Second World War. Today, its
significance could not be greater as the United States undertakes major interventions in
the Middle East and the UN continues its operations in the Balkans and in many other
regions of the globe6 • With an increasing number of states becoming defined as weak and
failing, the importance of developing a viable system of state reconstruction can only
increase.

The intervention in East Tim or after 1999 is an important case study of nation building.
Until the outbreak of violence in May 2006, East Timar was viewed by the international
community as a shining success for both the UN and proponents of nation building
interventions worldwide and this perception was used to promote an international
commitment to nation building as a solution to global issues of weak and failing
states(Kurlantzick, 2006, pp.1-2; Urbina, 2002). However, the failure of the newly
independent East Timorese government in early 2006 calls into question the viability of
nation building and reconstruction projects. It is vital, then, that the problems
encountered in nation building in East Timar are fully understood.

These include operations in the African nation states of the Ivory Coast, Liberia and
Burundi, and also other operations around the world including Haiti and Lebanon.

6
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The Timorese intervention also has significance as a regional issue for nation states in
Southeast Asia and the Pacific. The presence of an "arc of instability" throughout the
Pacific Rim has heightened concerns about regional security (Rumley, Forbes & Griffin,
2006). The failure of the East Timorese intervention has major repercussions especially
for those regional states such as Malaysia and Thailand, who were involved in the initial
intervention through to 2002, and are likely to be called back to Timor under the guise of
a future UN rescue mission. This, of course, is a reality for Australia who has already
been forced to deploy troops in Timor to quell the sudden violence.

11

CHAPTER 1:
THE EVOLUTION OF NATION BUILDING

This chapter will examine the idea of "nation building" as it has developed in both theory
and practical implementation during the last century. It is vital to clearly articulate the
components of nation building, as they have played a substantial role in directing the
goals and mandates of operations through to East Timor in 1999 and beyond. First of all,
however, it is important to understand the enduring concepts that have underpinned
nation building and how these have evolved.

Benedict Anderson (1983, pp.5-6) wrote in his "Imagined Communities" that a nation is
an "imagined political community ... both inherently limited and sovereign", and is so
imagined because in even the smallest nation, no one citizen can ever hope to fully come
to visualise the entirety of his or her nation. Anderson (1983, pp.5-6) argued that for a
nation to exist, its citizens must create for themselves an image of what their nation
consists of, because there is little means to quantitatively measure the existence of
nations. In turn, a nation is seen to be inherently limited as its very existence presumes
the fellow existence of other nations.

In addition, Anderson (1983, pp.5-6) argues that a nation does not .endeavour to
encompass all of the peoples of the world, such as those peoples belonging to a religion
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do, for it is inherently secular, and draws its definition from the existence of fellow
nations. Finally, Anderson (1983, p.7) argues that a nation was sovereign because this
allowed its citizens to wrest away power from their traditional rulers during the upheavals
of The Enlightenment. Nations provided their citizens with a legitimate alternative to the
traditional rule of the aristocracy, and through this function served to provide their
citizens with a common identity.

For a nation to be "imagined" into reality, however, historically there has been a
commonality between its members (Anderson, 1983, p.7). Most traditional nation states
replaced the binding force of their monarchy or ruling class with the ideals that all of
their citizens were of similar characteristic, which could include ethnicity, culture or
language (Anderson, 1983, pp. 7-8). This ideology of the modern nation state was first
defined at the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years' War and
where all parties agreed on basic principles that would come to underpin present days'
international relations (Gross, 1948, pp. 23-25)7. These included the ideals of
sovereignty, equality, and non-intervention in a nation state's affairs, all of which become
especially pertinent when examining the nation building operation in East Timor.

Despite these developments, it was not until the creation of the United States of America
in 1776, and the subsequent outcome of its internal conflicts and prejudices, that the

The Thirty Years' War was both a religious war fought between the Protestant and
Catholic sections of Christianity, and a territorial-based conflict between the various
dynasties of Europe during the 17th Century. Its conclusion in 1648 led much of Europe to
acknowledge a form of international relations whose guidelines are still in use in the 21st
Century, despite the presence of such super-national organisations as the United Nations
and the Bank of Reconstruction and Development (World Bank).

7
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world was faced with a nation made up of citizens that had little in common apart from
the region in which they resided (Stephenson, 2005, p. 1). It is important to note here that
a "nation" differs from what is defined as a "state", as this term refers to the apparatus
used to govern the nation. Subsequently the term "nation state" defines a nation that is
seen to have a legitimate, or at least functioning, governing apparatus.

The issues of commonality and nationhood are relevant to the nation building operation
in East Timor because of the apparent inability of the UN operation to adequately address
the underlying ethnic tensions that plagued the East Timorese operation throughout its
mandate, and through to the crisis of 2006. The Timorese people are made up of different
tribal ethnicities and dialects, all of which provided obstacles for the UN operation that
was attempting to bring about an East Timorese nation; something that while being
greatly desired by the Timorese, was alien to their traditional tribal society.

As Anderson argues above, a traditional requirement for nationhood is that there is a
sense of commonality among its citizens. This common identity can come from cultural
ties, similar language, or with greatest relevance to East Timor, ethnicity. Walker Connor
(1994, cited in Brock, 2001, pp.1-2) argued this point specifically when he asserted that
''theories of 'nation building' have tended to ignore the question of ethnic diversity or to
treat the matter of ethnic identity superficially as merely one of a number of minor
impediments to effective state-integration". In essence, although ethnicity is an integral
component when forming a nation, traditionally nation building operations have failed to
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place any significant emphasis on addressing issues of ethnic tension (Connor cited in
Brock, 2001, pp.1-2).

Such issues will be addressed in greater detail in the following chapters. It is important
to emphasise here, however, that even the term nation building has caused some
controversy among the academic community. The use of the term "state building" is also
commonly found among the relevant literature, and can cause confusion in this instance,
as it is often interchanged with the term "nation building". Critics of nation building
argue that external forces can never effectively build nations. However, Fukuyama argues
that rebuilding the institutions of the state is integral to any endeavour to reform or
stabilise a nation. Therefore, state building can serve as a precursor to nation building,
which in turn serves as a predecessor to the formation of nationhood (Fukuyama, 2004,
p.1).

Both Dobbins and Fukuyama argue in addition to this that "state building" as a standalone term lacks the ability to encompass many of the functions carried out during such
interventions such as stabilising the populace, securing the roles of the military and
police, economic development, and therefore the term nation building is more appropriate
(Dobbins, 2004, p.2; Fukuyama, 2006, p.3). Whether the term "nation building" is any
more appropriate than "state building" remains unresolved. However, it is true that nation
building is a distinctly American term and, as Fukuyama (2005, p.134) attests in his own
work ironically titled "State Building", it is drawn from the experiences of the United
States where political and social institutions of the state were major factors in the creation
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of the American nation. Indeed, as asserted above, traditionally nation building has done
little to address issues of ethnic diversity, both as a symptom of state failure, and as an
underlying cause (Brock, 2001, pp.8-13). Despite arguments about its inaccuracy, nation
building is now the term found in most common use. Consequently it is used as such in
this thesis.

Nation building, therefore, essentially describes an intervention by an external power into
the affairs of a sovereign state, in order to stabilise that state's situation, initially to
suppress any civil unrest or conflict, and subsequently to rebuild institutions that may
have failed or been disrupted (Fukuyama, 2005, pp. 133-135). It differs from a simple
occupation in that the intervening force intends to hand back sovereignty to the
indigenous population at the earliest possible juncture, and the "client state" of such an
intervention is a weak or failing state that has been deemed unable to govern or fulfil the
basic needs of its population (Ottoway, 2004, p.22)8. A common misconception is that
nation building requires the approval of the nation state's government and/or leading
political groups; however, this is not actually the case. Many nation building operations
take piace against the wishes of that state's population and often this hostility is simply
an extra obstacle that the intervening forces must overcome (Dobbins, 2005, p.5).

While the academic world has largely come to a consensus on the traditional forces
behind nation building, what constitutes nation building in its modern form is still widely
debated. There is agreement on the overall goals of the nation building process; however,

a Whether this inability actually exists or is to an extent propagated by outside forces,
including the intervening states, can be somewhat contentious.
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the actual phases and components that are designed to achieve these goals are still the
subjects of dispute. Francis Fukuyama, who has concentrated his study on the Americanled interventions of the late 20th and early 21st Century, was originally a major proponent
for nation building operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Fukuyama has become
increasingly critical of the manner in which the USA and its global partners have
undertaken these interventions (Fukuyama, 2006, pp.231-233).

Fukuyama has put forward a different view to Dobbins on how nation building
interventions are to be undertaken, though the core tenets of the theory of stabilising,
rebuilding institutions that will culminate in a final withdrawal are agreed upon by
Dobbins, Fukuyama and the international and academic community9 . Differences of
opinion have to date arisen on where and how these criteria should be applied. Many
nation building operations have stalled because they have failed in one phase of the
intervention, and this has prevented the operation from achieving a sustainable success
and final withdrawal, compelling the intervening forces to remain deployed indefinitely
(Knaus & Martin, 2003, pp. 60-65). The chapter will now outline the key components
that formulate "nation building", and ex8;mine why both the academic and political fields
have failed to adequately define a sustainable theory, let alone implement it.

Nation building as a term has been around for the better part of six decades. It grew out
of the reconstruction and development efforts of the late 1940s and 1950s as the world
slowly began its recovery from the Second World War. Much of Europe and Asia had
See Dobbins' RAND reports, Fukuyama's "Nation Building" (2006) and "State building"
(2005), as well as transcript from "A Brookings Briefing: US and UN Roles in Nation Building:
A Comparative Analysis, for further details and discussion.

9
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been devastated by the conflict and the task of rebuilding institutions and providing aid
and resources was the most popular and effective response to the situation that the
international community faced during this period (Sutton, 2006, pp.42-61).

From this heyday ofreconstruction and development operations in the 1940s and 1950s
through to the nation building interventions that have taken place and are underway in the
21st Century, a stable, yet sometimes ambiguous idea of nation building has evolved
(Fukuyama, 2006, pp.1-6). Such divergences between academics can be seen, for
example, in that Cynthia A. Watson argues that the first phase of any nation building
intervention is confined to the task of stabilising the state and ensuring the cessation of
violence against the indigenous population (2004, p.10). The second phase, according to
Watson, encompasses the provision of humanitarian aid, the reconstruction and
development of state institutions, and the rebuilding of civil infrastructure (Watson, 2004,
pp. 10-11).

Fukuyama, however, asserts that many of the initial reconstruction efforts fall into the
first phase of the intervention. Humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and attempting to
restart a country's economy are all processes that directly contribute to the stability of the
states in question (Fukuyama, 2004, p.2). Again still, Marvin Wienbaum (2004, p.2)
places greater emphasis on ensuring that the economy of the client state is quickly
restarted and given sufficient external support, as this is vital to ensuring that funds are
available to reconstruct state institutions and maintain them once external funding has
abated. Wienbaum (2004, p.2) also argues that this push towards a reinvigorated
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economy will also "spur demands for the rule of law and security, and (strengthen) civil
society".

Despite these differences of opinion, the underlying argument that runs through any
significant variant of nation building theory is that the two main aims of any nation
building intervention are to stabilise the state and then rebuild its institutions, whether
they be political, economic or social. Since the 1990s, nation building theory has again
gone through a metamorphosis. In the last two decades emphasis has been placed on the
final goal of any intervention to be the establishment of a democratic government that
governs a self-sufficient society (Dobbins, 2003, p.13). The USA has been the major
catalyst in attempting to impose its own liberal democratic values through nation building
interventions (Dobbins, 2003, pp.11-14). However, in the circumstance of East Timor, it
is apparent that the UN and the international community also aimed to quickly and
decisively create a functional democracy within the state of East Timor (McMahon, 2006,
p. 1).

Such a task seems both achievable and desirable. However, the record of the international
community in achieving such goals has been mixed. Interventions in Somalia, Haiti and
the Balkans during the 1990s all suffered from chronic deficiencies in planning and
resources, which often resulted in the intervention stagnating, and in cases such as
Somalia, resulting in terminal failure (Dobbins, 2004, p.85). Indeed prior to the apparent
successes of operations in East Timor, Eastern Slovenia, and Bosnia at the turn of the
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millennium, many in the international community were increasingly pessimistic of the
ability of such interventions to achieve state reconstruction (Flournoy, 2006, pp.86-88).

Nation building was seen as expensive both in manpower and resources. While the UN
and its staff were willing to undertake such enterprises, the organisation's member states
were disinclined to provide such operations with adequate resources (Rice, 2005, p.14).
In the event that an intervention actually received adequate resources, these often arrived
too late or could not reach the areas in which they were required with any reliability
(Ekbladh, 2006, pp.34-36). By this period, leading from the late 1990s to early 2001, the
only other significant undertaker of such interventions was the USA who, having been
stung by Somalia and Haiti, now regarded nation building operations as situations to
enter into warily, if not to be completely avoided (Dobbins, 2003, p.89).

Despite the unwillingness and/or inability of the international community to engage in
nation building interventions, such crises in weak and failing states continued to arise
throughout the late 1990s (Dobbins, 2004; Fukuyama, 2006, pp. 1-3; Rotberg, 2004,
pp.2-3). The international community was finally drawn into the long-standing conflict
and crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This intervention can be highlighted as an
important predecessor to the operation in East Timor, as a form of nation building
bureaucracy known as a Transitional Administration that was later used in East Timor
was first implemented in Bosnia. Subsequently, UNTAET attempted to avoid many of
the failures of the Bosnian intervention (Knaus & Martin, 2003, pp.60-63; Chopra, 2002,
pp. 981-983).
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This new form of intervention involved the intervening forces taking complete control of
the client state in almost every aspect. In the instances of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
Timor this external force was the UN, whose administration within the state essentially
became the sovereign representatives of that nation (Knaus & Martin, 2003, p 62). As
Jaret Chopra (2002, p.981) argues, such attainment of universal authority by the UN
administrators essentially created "state building through UN statehood". Proponents of
this form of nation building argue that the local populations, for reasons such as
corruption or lack of expertise, were unable to adequately govern their own affairs within
the intervention (Goldstone, 2004, p.84).

The solution to this lack of expertise was to give the intervening personnel authority to
act as representatives of the client state and therefore operate as would an elected
government in normal circumstances. Behind this development was the idea that such an
administration would be able to quickly and effectively provide the population of the
state the. basic necessities they required, and also begin to reconstruct the nation's
institutions without the obstacles of local corruption, inexperience or ethnic tensions
(Goldstone, 2004, pp.83-87) . However, while such authority allows the external
administrators to go about their roles in attempting to reconstruct the failed state, the
issue of checks and balances on such power arises. As Knaus & Martin argue in their
essay "Travails of the European Raj" (2003, p. 61-64), when such power is invested in an
outside authority, questions must be raised over accountability and corruption within the
external nation building apparatus.
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In the case of East Timor, observers and several former administrators have been
increasingly critical of the wide-ranging powers allotted to the transitional administrator
during the first crucial months of the occupation (Chopra, 2002, pp. 984-987; Philpott,
2006, p. 146; Steele, 2002, p.80). While this issue will be examined later in the thesis, it
does provide an opportunity to assess other shortcomings that arise when nation building
enterprises are undertaken. Some of these issues were touched on above, such as lack of
resources and manpower, but there are also other obstacles that nation building
interventions must face, including legitimacy, hostility of the indigenous population and
insufficient organisation (Goldstone, 2004, pp. 83-88).

An almost universal issue with nation building operations since the 1990s has been the
failure to provide sufficient resources and/or manpower to the operation. Apart from
early operations in Germany and Japan, nation building operations have mostly failed in
their goals because of the inability to provide sufficient logistical support (Dobbins,
2003; Dobbins, 2004; Ottaway, 2004; Fukuyama, 2006, pp.1-12). The reasons behind
such failures are often quite obvious. In the case of operations undertaken by the United
Nations, the inability of UN administrators to secure the full support of a necessary
number of member nations, especially in areas such as troop deployment and police
detachments can often undermine an operation before it has begun. Subsequently, the
lack of military power results in instability within the state, as the nation building forces
find they are unable to adequately control and disarm the local population, and this
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instability prevents the steady supply of other resources such as humanitarian aid and
equipment (Dobbins, 2003; Dobbins, 2004).

In contrast, the other major undertaker of nation building operations, the USA, often
faces issues of a different nature. Traditionally the USA has been able to deploy
sufficient military and police forces to a region, but has been unable to provide the civil
reconstruction and assistance that the local population requires (Dobbins, 2003, pp. 162164). Conflicts arising from separate chains of command for the civil and military wings
of the USA nation building apparatus have often prevented the USA from adequately
providing the operation with the resources and manpower it requires to effectively
reconstruct its institutions. These separate chains of command also tend to develop
disconnected and often conflicting contingency plans, and this has contributed to the
stagnation of such nation building operations (Berger & Scowcroft, 2005, p .3; Cabe,
2005, pp.1-5; Dobbins, 2004).

The final, but perhaps most important, issue when examining the relative challenges of
nation building interventions is the inability of such operations to succeed in their
mandates and accomplish a withdrawal, leaving behind a sustainable and independent
nation state. The most enduring nation building successes of post-war Germany and
Japan required the deployment of significant resources and troops for a sustained period
of several years, even after the interventions were deemed to have succeeded in their
mandates (Dobbins, 2003, pp.22, 32-33). However, recent nation building operations
have been characterised by the anxiousness of the intervening forces to withdraw in the
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shortest possible time period, or a reluctance to provide adequate resources to the
intervention. This reluctance to employ the necessary components for such interventions
suggests a lack of understanding by contemporary nation builders of the long term
demands of nation building enterprises.

This lack of understanding is reflected in the literature on nation building, even amongst
the fields' elite such as James Dobbins and his team at RAND, and Francis Fukuyama,
which fail to adequately outline any effective withdrawal strategies for potential nation
building operations. Indeed, both the RAND team and Fukuyama, while asserting that
withdrawing from a nation building intervention can be a long and difficult process,
imply that if the initial phases of stabilisation, and reconstruction and development of
institutions are successful that a withdrawal is more of an end result than an actual part of
the operation 1°. Most nation building strategies acknowledge that the interventions will
take significant time periods to complete, but at the same time seek to reduce these time
periods at every opportunity.

At the present moment, the inability to withdraw from interventions in Bosnia, Iraq, and
Afghanistan, as well as the redeployment of troops to East Timor and regions of Africa
highlight the deficiencies that exist in both the initial phases of nation building, as well as
in staging a final withdrawal. This inability is caused by both traditional issues such as
lack ofresources and personnel and continued civil unrest, as well as the widespread
misconception that has developed over time that a withdrawal is a final result of an
10 In his "Nation Building 101 (2004)", Fukuyama does briefly describe this withdrawal as a
final component of the overall reconstruction phase. However, he does little to expand
upon this.
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intervention rather than an integral phase of it. While limited in scope and size, the thesis
will devote a chapter to this final nation building phase, not only because of its overall
significance to a variety of operations over the last two decades, but also because it serves
as an integral factor in understanding why nation building failed in East Timor after the
final withdrawal of UN forces in 2005.

This chapter has provided an understanding of what nation building consists of, and how
the theory has developed through its implementation in the various operations that have
been undertaken since the end of the Second World War. The chapter has also
highlighted the general issues that arise when attempting to undertake a nation building
operation in any situation, and how these issues can prevent the success of an
intervention. It is especially important to note in the context of East Tim or that nation
building as a theory has changed shape considerably in the last decade, and today there is
a very real emphasis on political reconstruction (read democratic institutions) over the
traditional social and economic rebuilding, but at the same time the familiar challenges of
nation building are also apparent.

The problems discussed in the wider literature of nationalism and defining a nation, and
especially in the context of the pressures of ethnic diversity, add to the complexities
facing the UN nation building exercise in Timor. It will be argued subsequently that the
nation building operation in East Timor has avoided many of these pitfalls, but has
inevitably suffered from its own deficiencies in addition to repeating several failures that
have become typical of such interventions. Finally the chapter has attempted to provide a
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brief overview of the form of nation building used in the East Tim or intervention, that of
the transitional administration. This is particularly pertinent in relation to the following
chapter, as the thesis will now turn to institutions of nation building that were
implemented in East Timor, and additionally whether this transitional administration was
effective.
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CHAPTER2
THE REFERENDUM, THE VIOLENCE, AND THE INITIAL FORMATION OF
THE TIMORESE OPERATION (MAY 1999-MARCH 2000)

The referendum is often overlooked when examining the East Timor intervention; it is
seen more as a precursor or cause of the violence that would follow, rather than being
connected to the overall UNTAET operation. However, the potential for the violent
events that followed the referendum was foreseen before the vote, and the failure of the
international community to respond was a large factor in why the conflict was so
widespread, and also became a driving force behind efforts to resurrect Timor in the
following months. This chapter will examine both the lead-up to, and the conduct of, the
referendum, as well as the early formation ofINTERFET and UNTAET.

11

The UN had originally foreseen a peaceful and orderly transition from Indonesian rule to
Timorese independence after the referendum of 1999 (UN Security Council, 1999, pp.12). Popular consultation was widely seen as being both a desirable and achievable
objective of the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), a process which

11

The roles of the regional powers such as Australia, Malaysia and Thailand, as well as
Timor's former colonial master in Portugal, will be examined in passing, as they all played
a part in the nation building operation. However the limitations of this thesis do not allow
for any significant examination of their individual roles. The role of Indonesia will also be
noted in the context of its transition from occupier to sovereign neighbour.
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would seek to maximise Timorese involvement in the decision making procedures during
the intervention (Chopra, 2002, p. 983). It was optimistically assumed that the
Indonesians would make good on their undertakings to carry out a swift and orderly
withdrawal from Timorese territory and, under such protection, the UN officials could
commence with the early programs designed to stabilise the fledgling state's economy
and infrastructures (Gorjao, 2002, p. 315; Martin & Mayer-Reickh, 2005, p.127).

As early as July 1999, however, it became apparent that the Indonesians were failing to
provide the mission with the "basic security guarantees that they had committed to", and
although the vote was pushed back to the end of August, there was little improvement in
the stability of the region, and sporadic violence continued (Chopra, 2002, p.983) 12 • The
UN had attempted to forge an agreement between the Indonesians and the major
Timorese resistance group Falintil, to the effect that both sides would agree to practise
restraint leading up to the referendum. However, the Indonesians continued to evade clear
commitment on such security issues (Chopra, 2002, p.983; Martin & Mayer- Reickh,
2005, p.127).

The inability to hold the Indonesians to an agreement caused great concern among UN
officials, especially UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan who argued that there was great
anxiety over the fact that none of the parties involved were ever able to discern that the
"necessary security situation" existed that would allow the "peaceful implementation of

12 The final election date of August 3Qth was not the original date. The elections, originally
set for the Sth August, were postponed because of violence that had occurred after the
initial agreement on the ballot during May and the inability of UNAMET to deploy within
the time specified.
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the consultation process" to go ahead (Martin & Mayer-Reickh, 2005, p.127). Essentially
the UN officials on the ground were forced to drive ahead towards the referendum,
without having secured any significant concession that the safety of themselves and the
Timorese would be maintained.

The abject failure of the Indonesian forces to maintain order after the vote, and in many
cases their collusion with the militias terrorising large tracts of Timorese territory,
resulted in the widespread destruction of the majority of Timor' s infrastructure. A
significant portion of the Timorese population was forced to flee to Indonesian controlled
West Timor or into remote regional areas within East Timor to flee the violence, although
this did not prevent the murder and assault of thousands of Timorese. The UN was forced
to quickly modify its strategy from a post-referendum taskforce with a responsibility to
oversee an orderly transition to Timorese independence, to an overarching nation
building intervention that would consist initially of a substantial peacekeeping force that
would stabilise Timor so that a large scale reconstruction operation could begin.
\

Despite the failure of the UN mission to secure a stable post-referendum period, the
achievements of the INTERFET forces after their deployment in September 1999 were
substantial. The international force was brought together with remarkable efficiency,
representing a significant break from preceding interventions that had been marred by
delays and disputes over deployments (Candio & Bleiker, 2001, p.69). Despite several
incidents through to January 2000, within a few short months of their initial deployment,
the INTERFET forces had achieved a state of stability in all Timorese districts and had
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essentially assumed "de facto responsibility for governance and rule of law until the
UN's presence had been effectively established" (Smith & Dee, 2003, p.46) 13 .

One of the major reasons for this success was that the INTERFET commanders had
endeavoured to provide the force with stronger and more wide-ranging rules of
engagement than in previous interventions, allowing troops to engage against possible
threats at the first sign of hostile intent (Gorjao, 2001, p.315; Steele, 2002, p.78).
INTERFET was also successful in protecting the remaining UNAMET resources in
Timor that had escaped destruction by the militias, and these provided the incoming UN
staff with often vital information and equipment in an environment that was otherwise
totally devoid of such supplies (Martin & Reickh, p.112).

Once stability was achieved the INTERFET forces began to assist the intervention in a
policing role, as well as attempting to recreate a legal system from the vacuum that had
been left by the violence (International Policy Institute, 2003). Because of this vacuum,
the INTERFET forces were forced to rely upon Indonesian law, as this was the only
system with which most Timorese were familiar. INTERFET modified the Indonesian
law where necessary so that it was consistent with Geneva conventions, and this became
an early success (UNTAET, 1999). The subsequent handover of policing responsibilities
to the UNT AET contingent was less successful, as the civil administration was
constrained by its cumbersome bureaucracy. However, the progress made by INTERFET
during the early months of the intervention meant that stability was maintained, and some
level of judicial process took place (Smith, & Dee, 2003, p.83).
13

For details of these security incidents see U.N. document S/2000/53.
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With the success of the INTERFET forces in stabilising the security situation in Timar,
the UN administration was able to proceed with the implementation of the now
substantially larger post-referendum operation. Such an operation would need to retain
the mandate of the UNAMET operation, while at the same time address the widespread
destruction of much of Timar which had resulted in increasing threats of a humanitarian
crisis (Gorjao, 2002, p. 314). Subsequently, the UN Security Council approved the
formation of the United Nations Transitional Administration to East Timar (UNTAET).
The scope ofUNTAET's responsibilities was without precedent. For the first time the
UN had taken "sovereign control" of a territory, effectively creating a "UN governorship
within a sovereign territory" (Gorjao, 2002, p. 314).

The push for the administration to have such wide-ranging powers had come largely from
those who had been involved in the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), where the lack of
UN authority had made it impossible for the operation's objectives to be achieved,
although there had been calls for such omnipotent interventions since the end of the Cold
War (Betts, 1994, pp. 20-21; Gorjao, 2002, p. 314). Simon Chesterman (2001, p.9)has
argued that this incremental improvement in UN nation building is symptomatic of the
deficiencies in the organisation's approach to its mission. In effect the administration is
always one operation behind the current intervention. In Chesterman' s words, therefore,
"Kosovo got the operation that should have been planned for Bosnia, and East Timar got
that which should have been sent to Kosovo (2001, p.9).
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Such an assertion also allows the emphasis of a relevant point, that many of the UN
administrators from Kosovo were heavily involved in senior positions in the UNTAET
operation. Sergio Vieira de Mello, the Special Representative of the UN SecretaryGeneral and Transitional Administrator ofUNTAET, had held the same position as head
of the Kosovo mission. Essentially the core staff ofUNMIK had been surgically
transplanted in the Timorese mission, without any significant knowledge of Timor or its
local and specific issues (Suhrke, 2001, p.7). Both Chesterman and Suhrke argue that this
is typical of a UN operation, where the administration staff members are largely recruited
for their previous administrative and academic expertise, and little regard is given to their
ability to adapt to local issues (Chesterman, 2001, p.9; Gorjao, 2001, p.317; Suhrke,
2001, p. 2).

This lack of local experience can be seen as a main factor in determining why the
administration failed to quickly establish itself and set about achieving its mission. While
the arrival of the Australian-led INTERFET forces quickly overcame any substantial
resistance from the pro-Indonesia militias, UNTAET was perceived as making only slow
progress (Gorjao, 2001, p.317). This caused significant consternation among the
Timorese. With stability achieved they swiftly turned their attention to "demands for
political and economic development in preparation for independence" (Chesterman cited
in Gorjao, 2001, p.317).

Of course, in light of the massive destruction to infrastructure and the withdrawal of an
Indonesian bureaucracy that had prevented any significant local participation in the
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administration of pre-independence Tim or, there are significant arguments that can be
made in defence ofUNTAET's initial slow performance (Chesterman, 2002, p. 60;
Philpott, 2006. P.143). However, the UNTAET staff immediately went on the defensive,
arguing that the lack of experience and education among the local population was a major
reason that early progress had been slow, and further justified the need for the
international make up of UNTAET staffing, which was now developing into a significant
bureaucracy (Fox, 2001, p.6).

It is ironic that UNTAET argued that a lack of expertise pervaded the early progress of
the operation, as in several key areas it was lack of expertise and local knowledge from
the international staff that caused serious problems. A widespread issue among the
'1

international staff was the lack of language skills, particularly Indonesian, which could be
used to communicate with the local Timorese (Fox, 2001, p.6). The only Timorese who
the UNTAET administrators had any success in communicating with were the exiles who
had returned from years in Diaspora, and it was therefore these individuals, some who
had been absent for upwards of two decades, who were "relied upon for an understanding
oflocal conditions" (Candio & Bleiker, 2001, p.73; Fox, 2001, p.6)

In addition to this, in areas where local knowledge actually exceeded that of the
international supervisors, especially in agriculture, little was done to indentify this
expertise and put it to good use (Fox, 2001, p.6). It often took UN administrators lengthy
periods of time to make their way out into the rural areas of Timor, despite the
importance of these regions to any attempt to jumpstart the economy (Chopra, 2002,
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p.985). These early failures ofUNTAET meant that the transitional administration
missed a unique opportunity to showcase to the East Timorese that it was a viable
operation.

It was not until late into 2000 that the UNT AET administrators finally admitted that the
current form of the operation was incompatible with the need to involve the Timorese in
the rebuilding of the country (Gorjao, 2001, p.319). UNTAET head Sergio de Mello,
approved a new governmental structure, a 33 member national council that would include
members from a wide spectrum ofTimorese society, including church and student
groups. This Council would also have cabinet positions, consisting of four Timorese and
four UNTAET staff members. De Mello would retain the overarching position as chair of
the cabinet, thus still fulfilling the requirements of the UN mandate. The Timorese now
felt that they were no longer bystanders in the restoration of their territory, and could
work with the UN to begin an effective program of rebuilding Timor's institutions.
Whether such participation and institution building was realised will be addressed in
Chapter 4 (Ramos Horta, 2000, cited in Gorjao, 2001, p.320).

Complimenting the UNTAET operation were teams from throughout the international
community, dominated by the major regional players in Australian and Malaysia, and
Timor's old colonial master Portugal. Portugal has played a unique role in the history of
East Timor, evolving from its 500 years as a sometimes brutal colonial master, to its
current status as a close ally of the small island nation (Ramos-Horta, 2005, p.5). It was
Portugal alone which decried the Indonesian invasion of 1975 and its subsequent
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occupation, and it was Portugal, in which many of Timor's current leaders found haven,
having fled the persecution of the Indonesian occupiers (Gorjao, 2001, pp. 102-107).

Portugal had also played an important role during the lead up to the 1999 referendum,
continually lobbying the Indonesian Government, the UN, and other regional states to
address the issue of Timor, and put pressure on the Habibie administration. The
Portuguese continued this Timorese representation at the May 5 Agreements and
throughout the months that followed before August 1999. They continued to play a
leading role in the reconstruction process during the subsequent UNTAET intervention,
and also provided troops to the INTERFET forces stationed in Timor.

Australia initially consented and recognised the Indonesian occupation of East Tim or in
1975 14, but by 1999 had joined the international community in pressing Indonesia to
allow the Timorese a vote on their independence. Australian Prime Minister John
Howard played an integral and personal role in convincing Indonesian President Habibie
to carry forward with the referendum (Ghoniem, 2003, p. 18). When violence broke out
after the publication of election results, Howard, along with UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan, lead the international community in pressuring Indonesia to allow an external
peacekeeping force (Martin and Reickh, 2005, p.131).

14 This appeasement was typical of Australian foreign policy during this period, where
Australian Government's, regardless of partisan ambitions, mirrored US policy when
dealing with foreign affairs in the Asia and Pacific region. The USA not only did not object
to the Indonesian Invasion of East Timor, US President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger
had been in Indonesia two days prior to the commencement of the occupation. They
are alleged to have verbally consented, Kissinger stating "the United States understands
the Indonesian position" on East Timor (Jardine, 1994).
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Both Australia and Portugal played major roles in the peacekeeping forces that were
deployed in East Timor after the outbreak of violence in 1999, and also played a role in
providing aid during UNTAET's three year intervention (UN General Assembly, 1999).
Australia also took leadership of the INTERFET mission, at one stage deploying 4,500
troops to the region, with INTERFET also headed by Australian Major-General Peter
Cosgrove. However, such an intervention would not have taken place without the support
of other regional states, such as a deployment of 1,500 troops from Thailand, or the
subsequent assumption of leadership of the UN peacekeeping force by LieutenantGeneral Jaime de los Santos of the Philippines (Cotton, 2001, pp.131-132).

In addition to these military deployments, a contingent of international police had been
deployed by 2001 from several regional states such as Bangladesh, China, Malaysia,
Nepal, New Zealand, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Thailand. This was a major step for many
of these Asian nations, who were forced to go against their traditional foreign policies of
non-intervention that had been agreed upon at Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) forums. But in breaking away from tradition they also put increasing pressure
on the Indonesian Government to accede to UN control of Timor after the initial violence
of 1999 (Cotton, 2001, pp. 130-132)

15

•

Consequently, with the initial leadership of

Australia, and the increasing cooperation of regional states, UNTAET was well resourced
and enjoyed unprecedented legitimacy, not least because a relenting Indonesia had also
approved the role that UNTAET was to play in the reconstruction of East Timor.

is See "Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia" at ASEAN website for further
details of this non-interference policy.
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This chapter has included a brief insight into the background of the Timorese referendum
and the makeup of the subsequent nation building intervention in East Timor. It has
examined how the UN mission within Timor in 1999 was unable to secure a stable
environment both before and after the referendum, resulting in significant violence and
destruction as pro-integration militias rampaged through the Timorese countryside.
However, it has also found that the INTERFET deployment in late 1999 was highly
successful in re-establishing a stable security environment within Timor. The often
substantial involvement of many of Southeast Asia's regional states, alongside that of
Australia and Portugal were also important in both ensuring the INTERFET force was of
sufficient size, and in convincing the Indonesian government to accede to the force's
presence in Timor.

The structure ofUNTAET, as a foreign entity acting as a legitimate sovereign
government to the East Timorese, meant that it faced a series of new challenges in
addition to traditional problems that face such operations. Never before had the UN taken
so much responsibility upon itself, and this meant that there was little precedent to assist
the transitional administrators when such challenges arose. While early challenges arose
for UNTAET over questions of legitimacy and jurisdiction, such problems became
systematic during the institution building phase as the intervention began to follow
conflicting goals of both serving as a sovereign government at the same time as working
towards a swift and major withdrawal. Such a paradoxical approach essentially brought
the reconstruction of Tim or to a halt, as will be examined in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 3:
THE SUCCESSES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF INSTITUTION BUILDING
IN EAST TIMOR

The success or failure of a nation building operation lies in its ability to create or rebuild
the institutions of the client state (Fukuyama, 2004, p. 2). While stability can be achieved
and maintained by the deployment of an overwhelming military force, the sign of a
successful nation building operation is that strong institutions and competent governance
can maintain this stability once such forces withdrew. An example of such a failure of
institution building are the long term military and policing deployments that have been
underway for much of the last decade with the Balkans region (Chesterman, 2001, pp. 110).

The reconstruction of institutions requires the intervening forces to initially take at least
partial control of the client state's governing bodies, but only as long as these bodies still
exist in some form. On occasion, as in the case of East Timor, these governing bodies and
institutions have been destroyed or were never in place, and in these cases the intervening
forces are required to build such foundations from the ground up. This is no easy task, of
course, and the majority of the operational resources once stability is achieved need to be
directed towards such reconstruction.

However, it has become a feature of recent nation building operations to ensure that such
institutions are rebuilt with the ideals of democratic governance and the participation of
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the population they have been created to serve (Ottaway & Carothers, et al, 2002, pp.18). Of course, it is natural for the external nation builders, when attempting to rebuild the
client states institutions, to mirror their own values and ideals. In recent cases where the
nation building interventions have largely been driven by the UN, USA and European
Union, the final goal of any state building exercise has been to create institutions that
adhere to the democratic ideals (Pei & Kaspar, 2003, pp.1-8).

Of course such emphasis on democratisation as a long term goal had little influence on
the initial period of the UNTAET intervention, which was continually criticized for its
failure to adequately allow for local Timorese participation (Chopra, 2002, pp.991-995).
In late 2000 UNTAET responded to such criticism, which had been echoed among the
Timorese, by reorganizing the administration and it departments, arguing that this would
allow for greater participation for the Timorese (UNTAET, 2001, pp.1-2). The original
National Consultative Council (NCC) that had been appointed (not elected) shortly after
the arrival of the UNTAET staff had been tasked with a variety ofresponsibilities,
including re-establishing a judiciary, setting an official currency, creating border controls
and creating a viable taxation system (Steele, 2002, p.80). However, while the council
had consisted of 11 Timorese and only four UNTAET staff, the NCC felt that their
suggestions were largely ignored by the UNTAET administration (Philpott, 2006, 146).

In response to continued protests, Transitional Administrator Vieira de Mello
subsequently created a 33-member National Council to replace the NCC in 2000. This
new National Council would include advocates from a variety of political, religious and
youth groups, and the eight ministerial positions would be shared equally between the
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Timorese and UNTAET staff (Smith, 2004, p.149; UNTAET, 2001). Yet, this revamp of
the administration was designed not just to increase local participation, but also to ensure
that the intervention was concluded within the proposed timeframe. From the beginning
of the intervention the UN and its administrators had given the Timorese operation
between three and four years to achieve its goals, and this was based on assessments of
the budgets of major contributors and with "what the Security Council's limited patience
with nation building would bear" (Goldstone, 2004, p. 87).

The redesign ofUNTAET"s structure was widely praised throughout the international
community (Beauvais, 2001, pp. 1127-1130).Yet, while the initial structure of the
original administration had been an obstacle; it now became apparent that the major
roadblock for Timor's reconstruction was the limited goals and reach of the intervention.
The mandate outlines a series of objectives that UNTAET was given the responsibility of
achieving, focussing specifically on the reconstruction of institutions and civil services
designed to ensure Timor's long term development 16 • However, by 2001 UNTAET had
prioritised the holding of free and fair elections in Timor as the ultimate achievement of
the intervention. This was in direct conflict with not only its mandate, as evidenced
above, but also the wishes and ambitions of the Timorese people (Philpott, 2006, p.146).
Regardless of these mandates it is argued, the transitional administration's main goal was
to essentially "work itself out of the job of governing" the client state in the shortest
timeframe available (Beauvais, 2001, p. 1111).

16

See appendices for a copy of the mandate.
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Both initially and in the years following the 2002 independence, there were calls for an
extended intervention that would allow the Timorese to rebuild under the long term
guidance of a UN operation (Donnan, 2006). This conflicted with both the UN roadmap
to independence, as well as being incompatible with the donor nations' limited patience
for such interventions. Even when the Timorese compromised to a timetable of five
years, it soon became apparent that this was unacceptable to their UN counterparts, and
the speed with which UNTAET progressed from a position of de facto sovereignty to an
official end of mandate withdrawal in June of 2002 was unprecedented (Goldstone, 2004,
pp.86-89; UNTAET, 2001, p.l).

UNTAET worked to bring about national elections in the shortest possible time period,
rather than engaging in long term capacity building that would have required UNT AET
involvement in Timar for the foreseeable future (Gorjao, 2002, p.316). While the
international community lauded the UNT AET administrators for the quick transition
from UN sovereignty to national elections and independence in 2002, some Timorese
were of the opinion that this frenzied movement towards elections was more of a "cut and
run" (Philpott, 2006, p. 149).

This focus on an election as a sign of a successful intervention was the product of several
forces. Perhaps the most notable for the UNTAET administrators was the determination
not to repeat past failures in Somalia, but also the inherent careerism and ambitions of the
UN officials (Martin & Mayer-Rieckh, 2005, p.134; Philpott, 2006, p. 14). Simon
Philpott (2006, p.146) argues that many of the UN staff in Timar were far more
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concerned with advancing their own careers than engaging in serious nation building
efforts. UN staffers would often serve only the required six month secondment before
moving onto other missions and operations, meaning that there was little chance of
sustained expertise in local Timorese issues, and that local officials and the population
were forced to deal with UN staffers that were inexperienced and unable to provide
effective assistance in vital areas of the operation. Regardless of the accuracy of these
claims, the turnover of U.N staff remained high (Philpott, 2006, p. 146).

Of course, this is not to say that UNTAET achieved nothing but bringing about elections
in East Timor. Institution building in Timor did take place, and by the time of the
withdrawal significant progress had been made. The Timorese capital ofDili benefited
significantly from the intervention, with simple living necessities such as power and fresh
water having been almost completely restored. As well as this other programs to rebuild
educational and healthcare institutions within the capital achieved successes, along with
the reconstruction of docks and airports to internationally accepted levels of functionality
(UNTAET, 2002, pp. 7-8).

International organisations such as the World Bank were integrated at unprecedented
levels within the intervention, allowing easy access to funding for humanitarian and
reconstruction missions (Chopra, 2002, p.985). The World Bank took control of funds
provided by various donor countries and organisations, siphoning them into special
accounts to be used by the transitional administration for various projects within Timor,
and this allowed initial capacity and institution building to take place in situations where
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immediate responses were required (Candio & Bleiker, 2001, p.71; UNTAET, 2001,
pp.3-4). As late as 2005, the World Bank was still contributing ten to fifteen million
dollars per financial year to the annual budget of the Timorese government (UNMISET,
2005, pp. 9-10).

UNTAET also made progress in several other areas. It provided a means for the
repatriation of refugees from West Timor, who numbered almost one third of the
population. It created an environment where the initial foundations for political
governance could be undertaken, though mostly at a central level (Steele, 2002, p.86).
Both UNTAET and Timorese leaders were able to resolve tensions with Indonesia,
allowing for direct communication between Timor and its former oppressor that led to
further cooperation over border security (Goldstone, 2004, p.92). UNTAET also obtained
nominal Indonesian assistance in prosecuting those responsible for the post-referendum
violence, although this was of only limited value, as will be examined below (Philpott,
2006, p.147).

Despite these successes, the nation building operations in Timor had little penetration
beyond the major urban areas in Dili and its suburbs. There was little infiltration into the
rural areas, where almost 80 percent of the Timorese population lived. The majority of
UNTAET staff were situated within the capital Dili, and subsequently this is where the
majority of the reconstruction programs took place (Chopra, 2002, pp. 987-991).
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This centralization was a long term characteristic of the UNTAET operation and
eventuated for a variety ofreasons. Fox (2003, p.11) argues that the "rigidity of the UN
mechanism and decision-making process, had created a serious credibility crisis", and
asserts that as a result of this the "public tended to see (the UNTAET administration) as
incompetent, and unreliable, yet expensive 'international experts"'. Chopra (2002,
pp.988-989) argues this point further still in that the UNTAET staff in Dili were engaged
in a form of power struggle with both the isolated district administrators in the field, and
the increasingly hostile Timorese, who felt that the UN officials were not performing
sufficiently in their reconstructive roles.

Chopra and Fox's claims are grave, arguing that the UNTAET administrators during the
first months of the occupation were more concerned with power struggles within the
transitional authority than with reconstructing the institutions of East Timor. This fits into
the arguments put forward by other writers that UN officials were more concerned with
their own career advancements than with the reconstruction programs, and also with the
apparent eagerness of the UN and international community to bring about an end of
mandate situation as quickly as possible. However, there is little opportunity to validate
these claims, though they are widespread and made by respected academics and former
UNTAET administrators. 17 What can be evidenced, though, is that regardless of the
reasons behind it, there was a failure by the transitional administration to engage in any
substantial or productive programs beyond the capital and surrounding areas where
UNTAET had its base of operations.

17

See Chopra, Goldstone, Philpott, Chesterman, Knaus, Martin for further reading,
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Apart from this tendency towards centralisation, there were several other areas where
UNTAET"s institution building remained incomplete and the significance of these can be
found through and examination of the series of UN Reports that were published by the
operations in Timor. The reports are underlain by inconsistency: serious problems
encountered with institution building sit alongside optimistic statements that the level of
progress was satisfactory. An examination of the documents throughout this chapter will
highlight these inconsistencies in detail, especially in areas of importance such as the
police and army, civic governance, and the judiciary.

While there were initial breakthroughs in the reestablishment of rule of law and judicial
progress during the early months of the intervention "UNTAET left the territory with few
experienced and trained East Timorese judges, public defenders, and prosecutors"
(Gorjao, 2002, p. 324). In addition to this, UNTAET was unable to provide the East
Timorese with any satisfactory progress in the arrest and prosecution of those responsible
for the post referendum violence, despite the fact that a court had been hastily arraigned
with authority to prosecute such crimes (Gorjao, 2002, p.324). The court, known as the
"Special Panel", mirrored the statute of the International Criminal Court, giving the
Special Panel jurisdiction over any "genocide, war crimes, torture and crimes against
humanity, and over murder and sexual offences committed between 1 January 1999 and
25 October 1999" (Linton, 2001, p.417).

However, the Special Panel was an ambitious project that like the regular Timorese
judicial system, suffered from insufficient resources and personnel that crippled its ability
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to pursue such a wide-ranging mandate. Also, permanent members of the Security
Council who were in a position to pressure the Indonesian Government into greater
cooperation with the Timorese in the pursuit of such criminals, refrained from doing so,
which greatly reduced the effectiveness of such prosecutions (Philpott, 2006, p.14 7;
Steele, 2002, p. 81).

The conclusion to this was that the majority of those responsible were never arrested or
faced trial, while many who were detained were subsequently either convicted of lesser
crimes or released, as the Timorese prosecutors were unable to meet the stringent
guidelines, such as burden of proof, that were demanded in such cases (Linton, 2001,
p.456). Controversy over the performance of the Special Panel continued through to the
end ofUNMISET's mandate in 2005, with UN Reports acknowledging the frustrations of
many Timorese over the perceived inadequacy of the judicial system and the sustained
indecision over its future (UNMISET, 2005, pp. 5-6).

In a region that produces only minimal produce available for export, UNT AET also faced
the momentous task of creating an economic infrastructure that could sustain a stable
Timorese nation. East Timor has little industrial capability, historically only coffee has
provided any export value, and a majority of Timorese citizens rely on agriculture and
subsistence farming for their livelihoods (East Timor's Economic Challenge, 2002).
During the UNTAET intervention many Timorese became dependent on both the aid
provided to them by the Transitional Administration, and the industry that had arisen
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around the intervention where Timorese provided services to the intervention's foreign
personnel (Scheiner, 2001 ).

Even during the final months before independence and the final UNT AET withdrawal the
UN was characterising Timar as" one of the least developed nations in the region",
despite at the same time arguing that "good progress" had been made and that "sound
management practices" had allowed for improvement in areas such as government
revenue targets (UNTAET, 2002, p.7). As of 2006 East Timar remains a nation that is
heavily reliant on foreign aid, described as "one of Asia's poorest countries"; one that
"faces long-term development challenges" (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade: East Timar Country Brief, 2006). In this context it is evident that UNTAET
withdrew from Timar without having completed the institution building that was required
to ensure sustained economic stability, let alone viability. Indeed it is apparent from the
heavy reliance on foreign aid that they were unable to ensure even short term stability
that was not controlled from either the U.N or other international aid organisations.

UNTAET also struggled to address the issue of land and property rights that had erupted
in the early months of the intervention. By the end of the Indonesian occupation "three
sets of legal claims competed for recognition: Indonesian, Portuguese, and traditional
ones", many of which had been subject to "successive waves of dispossession and
displacement" (Goldstone, 2004, p. 93). This was further exacerbated by the widespread
destruction that took place after the 1999 referendum, where a majority of the housing
was destroyed and over 90 percent of the population was displaced.
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With the return of a majority of this displaced populace being a prime objective for
UNTAET during the early months of the intervention, there was a surge in illegal
occupations of the few dwellings that remained, causing the issue of property rights to
become of major importance to the transitional administration (Country Strategy Paper:
East Timor, 2001, p.17; Goldstone, 2004, p.93). However, the Transitional
Administration was reluctant to become involved in an issue that had the potential to
cause a public backlash against the intervention at a time when the nation building
operation was still in its infancy, and "limited itself to temporary allocations of public
and abandoned land" (Goldstone, 2004, p.94). Such allocations resolved the issue in the
short term. However, it did little to address the issues of private ownership and in fact
fostered the assumption that the latest round of land occupations could be viewed as
legitimate.

Of particular relevance to the crisis of 2006 are the foundations of civic education and
public service. The breakdown of governance in 2006 emphasised the fragility of such
areas, yet an examination of reports that assess these areas presents contradictory
conclusions. During 2001 a "comprehensive 10-year programme for governance and
public sector development" was announced by the transitional administration,
emphasising the long term commitment required to institution building in Timor, and yet
it came less than a year before UNTAET's withdrawal (UNTAET, 2002,y.3).

48

Another report in 2004 promotes the "significant progress" of several institutions,
including the banking sector, in the process of removing the reliance on international
experts, but then concedes that "overall, many State institutions continue to depend on
international advisers to function effectively" (UNMISET, 2004, p.5). Indeed, later in the
report, the banking sector, highlighted earlier as an area of particular progress, is referred
to as particularly weak and fragile (UNMISET, 2004, p.14). This 2004 report also
addresses the then pending withdrawal ofUNMISET in early 2005, emphasising the
importance of a "coherent and effective exit strategy" to allow the final transfer of control
of public institutions to the Timorese to take place, despite as stated above, effective
governance was still heavily reliant on the assistance of the operation (UNMISET, 2004,
p.6).

Another major failing was the creation of the police and military forces. There was
debate over the need and construction of the East Timor Defence Force (FTDL) from its
very inception; many viewed it as simply a crude method of addressing the issue of the
former resistance group Falintil, whose members were reluctant to demobilize (Martin &
Mayer- Reickh, 2005, p.134). Indeed, it has been argued that the usefulness of the FDTL
was limited at best; Indonesia and Australia, Tim or's two closest and largest neighbours
are unlikely to invade, and if such an event did occur, the 3,500 strong military has little
capacity for any formidable defence of Timorese territory (Thakur, 2006).

Concerns over the construction and development of the FDTL continued throughout
UNT AET' s existence and beyond, it was not until 2004, that the military was capable of
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taking any significant responsibility in securing stability throughout Timar. A 2003 report
by UNMISET highlighted that even this was a forced transfer brought about the
continued withdrawal of international troop deployments (UNMISET, 2003a, p.11 ).
Perhaps the most obvious sign of the concerns shown over the viability of the FTDL can
be found in a 2005 UNMISET report, the last one before this mission's withdrawal,
which was critical of a UN Security Council decision not to retain a small force of
international troops within Timar (UNMISET, 2005, pp. 8-9). That this force, only 144
strong, was thought to have the ability to be a strong deterrent of violence in Timar
shows that the UNMISET administrators had little faith in the ability of the 3,000 strong
FDTL to maintain any effective form of stability within the country.

The creation and development of the East Timorese Police Force (PNTL) was also
plagued by failures and training deficiencies that would affect its long term capability.
Initial progress was slow, partly because UNTAET assigned little resources to developing
this institution during the beginning of the operation (Martin & Meyer-Rieckh, 2005,
p.135). Eventually, the development of the PNTL was made a priority within the
UNTAET operation and recruitment began apace, however, concerns over the ability and
training were raised. A 2001 mission report detailed the distribution of reference cards to
police that contained guides to how an arrest should be carried out and the importance of
ensuring that a suspect did not have their rights infringed upon (UNTAET, 2001, p.4).
The fact that so basic a measure was promoted as a success by UNT AET reinforces such
concerns of a divergence between the optimism that can be found in such mission reports,
and the actual reality of life on the ground in East Timar, and raises the question of
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whether an officer who was incapable of doing their job without such visual aids should
be given such responsibility

Such concerns would continue to be raised after independence and through to 2006. A
2004 UNMISET mission report promoted the fact that international police officers still
retained an "in-service training and mentoring" role for local officers, at a time when
UNMISET' s final withdrawal was imminent, again raising concerns about the ability of
the PNTL to maintain internal security once international forces withdrew (UNMISET,
2004, p. 8). Astonishingly, such concerns are even outlined within this same report,
which describes local officers as suffering from "a lack of professional knowledge and
expertise" and a "lack of respect for discipline and human rights" (UNMISET, 2004,
p.9).

Perhaps the most concerning issue when examining the PNTL, is the extent to which the
service became politicised. As of 2006 there has been criticism of the way in which the
Fretilin government used the police force to offset the power of the FDTL, as the military
was seen to have loyalties to President Gusmao (Philpott, 2006, p.151 ). This was most
apparent in the creation of several "special" units such as counter-insurgency and riot
police, that were so heavily armed as to be comparable to the military (Dodd, 2006;
Philpott, 2006, pp.151-152). Such political connotations bring a sinister aspect to what a
2004 UNMISET report described as the Timorese government's inability to" define the
roles of the PNTL and FDTL for internal security" (UNMISET, 2004a, p.8).
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The failures in institution building in these major instances are not isolated occurrences
and can also be examined in the context of overall operations shortcomings. Joel Beavais
(2001, p.1116) described the factors behind this failure as the UN's approach to "state
building (being) driven by the need to maintain centralised control, minimize the shortterm risk of failures, and maximise short term visible gains". This can be seen as an effort
to ensure that the intervention did not become stagnate to the point where there was no
viable exit strategy.

The result of this centralisation was that little aid reached the remote areas where it was
most needed, and that much of the aid that was designated for rural areas never reached
its destination, or was late in arriving. This centralising tendency, and the problems that
resulted, were apparent from as early as January 2000, where of the total UN staff who
had arrived to assist in the operation, 174 remained in the capital, while only 17 were
dispersed between the 13 districts (Chopra, 2002, p.988). The UN was accused of
saturating Dili with resources and staff, and the charge was that not only did this result in
a lack of resources reaching regional Timor, but that it also created an unsustainable
economy within the capital, built around a veritable financial system that had come to
rely on the UN's massive spending for its existence (Smith & Dee, 2003, 64)1 8 •

In late April 2000, local Timorese who were employed as UN staff in regional areas even
went on strike to protest the discrepancy in resources and salary that were evident
between mostly international staffers in Dili and those throughout the countryside
1a Also, see document A/55/443, published in October 2000, for staffing deployments.
Pages 46-50 show levels of staffing and relevant redeployments from field services to
other areas of UNT AET"s administration.
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(UNTAET, 2000). This was typical of the problems that the UNTAET intervention faced
throughout the first two years of the nation building operation, where the expectations
placed on the operations were not matched with identifiable results. Even in areas where
the UN was making progress, there was an inability on UNTAET's behalf to
communicate this to the Timorese public. Indeed, Michael G. Smith and Moreen Dee
(2003, p.65) assert that the UNTAET Office of Communication and Public Information,
the body responsible for keeping the population informed of the UN's progress, was itself
poorly resourced and unable to provide regular publications.

This tendency towards centralization threatened to destabilise the operation not just in
preventing resources from reaching the Timorese at a district level, but also by restricting
their involvement at an administrative level (Gorjao, 2002, p. 320). Complaints were
received from within the Timorese leadership, but also from within UNTAET and other
international institutions with a presence in Timar. Instead of attempting to implement
widespread training programs, any "skill-gaps" were filled by hiring increasing amounts
of "international experts". In addition to this the Timorese were critical of the way in
which the few who did serve as public officers were discriminated against by the
international staff (Fox, 2003, p.9).

This atmosphere of discrimination allowed resentment to grow towards the UNT AET
administration and staff, and this was not unwarranted. Concerns had been growing
through 2000 and 2001 over the "widening social and economic gaps between those who
worked and who did not work for the UN mission", and this was in addition to the
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discontent over the massive economic disparity between the local Timorese and the
international staff (Fox, 2003, p.11 ). As Chopra (2001, p.33) argued in his essay, titled
"The UN's "Kingdom of East Timor", comparisons with "colonial administrations were
unavoidable, and affirmed various forms of segregation between expatriates and the
Timorese".

While the redesign of the transitional administration during 2000 was supposed to have
given the Timorese a greater chance to participate in the rebuilding of the country, the
tendency towards centralisation of the UN staff and administrators, including Vieira de
Mello, meant that their request were often ignored or suppressed (Fox, 2001, pp. 6-8;
Gorjao, 2002, p.320). On top of this, UNTAET staff including Vieira de Mello continued
with the rhetoric that it remained difficult to find East Timorese with the experience and
expertise to be included in the Transitional Administration (Chopra, 2001, p. 33; Fox,
2001, p.12).

By December 2000, having served just months in their new positions, the Timorese
members of the transitional cabinet threatened to resign if more authority was not given
to them to direct the reconstruction progress (Gorjao, 2002, p.320). While this unrest did
result in UNTAET making significant changes, it did little to improve relations with the
Timorese leaders. By the end of 2000, calls to increase the pace towards Timorese
independence were made, and the UN acceded to such demands, which would see a
downsizing of the massive yearly expenditures that had existed since 1999 (UNTAET,
2001 ). It has been argued that the push towards independence in 2001, while
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understandable from both the Timorese and UN points of view, was premature. Martin
and Mayer-Rieckh (2005, p.136) describe that while the "elections ... were well organised
and took place without significant security related incidents ... the constitutional process
was rushed and political institutions were relatively weak at the time of independence".

In retrospect the institution building process in East Timor was torn between competing
agendas. Anthony Goldstone (2004, p.95) describes these conflicting roles as in one
manner carrying out the "broad institution building objectives thrust upon it by the
international community" versus the role of acting "the midwife to an incomplete state"
on its road to independence. UNTAET was never going to achieve the mandate enforced
upon it by the UN Security Council in 1999 and still meet an acceptable timetable for
member countries and other donors, who were eager for a timely withdrawal.

It has been argued that the consequence of these conflicting directions was that UNTAET
passed on to the Timorese citizens a nation building project that was incomplete. Through
its tendency towards centralisation and its initial reluctance to involve the Timorese in its
reconstruction projects, it left them without the expertise required to complete this
project. Still, in the years between 2002 and before the breakdown in 2006, critics of the
UN withdrawal were guardedly positive, even when emphasising the operation's
shortcomings 19 • UNTAET had left East Timor in a secure environment, with adequate
funding for further reconstruction projects, and after the. devastation of 1999 and the
vacuum it left, the intervention was seen as a success (Goldstone, 2004, pp.95-86).

19

An examination of the articles used in this paper finds that a majority published before 2005 remainedd
modestly optimistic for East Timor's future potential, despite its many shortcomings.
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The political crisis and civil unrest of 2006, of course, presents a different outcome, but it
was the results of the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the presidential elections in
2002 that were of most significance to the situation that unfolded during this year.
Therefore the next chapter will examine these elections and the political manoeuvring
that occurred before, during and after Timorese independence in 2002. It has been argued
throughout this thesis that understanding the events surrounding the final withdrawal and
return of sovereignty from UNTAET to the Timorese was integral to understanding the
factors behind the crises that were to follow four years later.
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CHAPTER 4:
UNTAET'S WITHDRAWAL AND THE RISING DOMINANCE OF THE
FRETILIN POLITICAL PARTY

The inclusion of the withdrawal phase of nation building as a separate chapter may
initially seem unusual. It is true that it is addressed only seldomly when investigating
nation building theory. Indeed, many take for granted that the conclusion of any
successful nation building operation will see the return of administrative power to the
indigenous population. The client state, who having had civil order restored, its
institutions rebuilt, and having been schooled on the governmental responsibilities it must
undertake, will now continue the process of rebuilding and developing their nation into
that bastion of western ideals and the ultimate goal of any western led nation building
operation; liberal democracy.

However, as has been argued throughout the thesis, when addressing the nation building
operation in East Timar, the return of sovereignty is as important a phase of the
reconstruction process as either of its two preceding phases. This is argued on the basis of
three main points. First, previous nation building operations have shown that the return of
sovereignty often becomes the most difficult phase of the nation building process, with
the interventions in the Balkans being a prime historical example. Secondly, it was the
frenzied push towards independence and withdrawal of the operation in East Timar that
bares at least partial blame for the subsequent institutional failures and conflicts that have
arisen in the four subsequent years. Finally, and in direct relation to the previous points,
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is the issue of ethnicity within East Tim or, and how the premature withdrawal of the
UNTAET operation set in motion events that allowed underlying ethnic tensions within
the country to come to the fore.

This final phase has received little attention because it is often seen more as a result of a
successful operation than as a recognisable factor in measuring its effectiveness. In the
last decade, however, it has become apparent in operations in Somalia, the Balkans, and
subsequently in Afghanistan and Iraq, that a final withdrawal of intervening personnel
and forces, from a situation that is agreeable to both the intervening force and client state
is in fact difficult to achieve (Chesterman, 2002, p.45-48). Indeed, in several recent
operations, circumstances where a favourable end of mission situation could occur still
seem little more than a pipe dream. It was as a result of operations such as those in
Kosovo and Somalia that forced the transitional administrators in East Timar to attempt
to avoid a situation where UNTAET could become unable to extricate itself from the
operation (Morphet, 2002, p.140-142).

As stated above, this determination to avoid an operational quagmire resulted in the
UNTAET staff and the UN' s general apparatus pushing for general elections and
Timorese independence in the shortest possible timeframe. This rush towards general
elections has been criticised for not allowing Timorese political parties sufficient time to
organise themselves for the campaigns. The short time frame and the tendency of the
UNTAET staffers to side with the dominant Fretilin Party, is argued to be a cause of
Fretilin's dominance of Timor's political landscape (Chopra, 2002, pp.992-994).
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Yet the dominance of Fretilin and its backers cannot be explained away simply through
its popularity as a resistance organisation turned political party. As George Quinn (2006,
p.1) argued earlier this year, behind such political manoeuvring is a long and violent
history of deep ethnic divisions within Timorese society. This ethnic division can roughly
be divided into two opposing factions of "western" and "eastern" East Timorese. While
this distinction overlooks the wide variety of tribal and territorial divisions that exist
within these groups, it was the overarching "west" versus "east" divisions that had
originated under Portuguese rule that were ofrelevance to the events of 2006 (Byrne,
2006, p.2). The "easterners" are known as the Lorosa'e and are associated with the
independence movements and the guerrilla warfare that was a characteristic of the
decades of Indonesian occupation, while the "westerners" or Loromonu are often seen as
Indonesian sympathisers and having been complicit with the occupation (Quinn, 2006,
p.1).

Fretilin as a political party originated from Frente Revolucionaria de Timor-Leste

Independente, the major Timorese resistance group during the country's occupation by
Indonesia. 20 The party is famous within the Timorese population not only for its
reputation as a resistance organisation, but also for the several leading personalities that
have, at various stages, had strong ties with the group, including Xanana Gusmao, Mari
Alkatiri, and Jose Ramos Horta21 (Shoesmith, 2003, pp.238-242).

Frente Revolucion6ria de Timor-Leste lndependente =Revolutionary Front for an
Independent East Timor
21 Both Gusmao and Ramos Horta withdrew from the party during the 1980s. Dennis
Shoesmith argues that this withdrawal was the result of a falling out between Gusmao
20
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Fretilin and its supporters have benefited from this reputation as the leading
independence group within Timor, and have been highly successful in transferring this
popularity into political capital. Their claims of having been a driving force behind the
Indonesian withdrawal in the late 1990s are essentially invalid, but won the party wide
support within the Timorese population (Quinn, 2006, pp.1-2). 22

As a result of this popularity, their input and advice was relied upon heavily during the
UN intervention. Transitional Administrator Vieira de Mello initially relied heavily on
former leader Xanana Gusmao's recommendations during the first months of the nation
building operation. However this changed with the rise of Alkatiri as leader of the Fretilin
faction who usurped Gusmao's role as a close ally and advisor of the UNTAET
administrator (Beauvais, 2001, pp. 1110-1116; Chopra, 2002, p.990; Gorjao, 2002,
pp315-320).

In the subsequent build up to independence and general elections in 2001, Fretilin

therefore took an increasingly dominant role in the affairs of the state (Chopra, 2002, p.
994). Fretilin was able to embed itself within the UNTAET decision making process,

and Alkatiri. Gusmoo has since maintained that Fretilin holds no special privileges over
other Timorese political parties. AlkatirL leader of Fretilin, argues that Fretilin indeed holds
privileges, and these privileges are drawn from its reputation as a resistance force during
the Indonesian occupation.
22 Though Fretilin enjoys its reputation as the leading Timorese resistance group, it had
little influence on the decision by Indonesia to allow a referendum of Timorese
independence. This was brought about by the unstable situation within Indonesia
following constitutional crises and the damage caused by the Asian Financial Crisis of
1997, accompanied with the relatively weak administration of President Habibie who was
reluctant to risk further isolation from the international community at a time when he
neededthe~support.
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allowing it to push forward with its agenda for Timorese elections, and the
implementation of its own constitution. This dominance exerted by Fretilin also
diminished the influence of the President (Chesterman, 2001, pp.168-169; Philpott, 2006,
p.149; Smith, 2004, pp.154-155). The results of these elections were outlined above, but
it is important in this context to reinforce the point that Fretilin were integral in
pressuring UNTAET into holding the elections as early as it did, ensuring that opposition
parties had little opportunity to form any significant backing (Philpott, 2006, p.149). This
ensured that Fretilin was virtually unopposed in the months following elections.
UNTAET"s administrators and election observers were concerned by these events, but
refrained from intervening, for fear of being seen to interfere in what was to be an
indigenous election process (Chopra, 2002, pp.993-994).

Yet it was not only Fretilin' s glorified history and ethnic background that gave it
influence within the Timorese population. It was also regarded highly by many Timorese
for its long standing assistance to the populace during the occupation, and also in the
chaos that followed the rejection of Indonesian sovereignty in 1999. This was especially
so in remote areas, where resources where scarce and the ability ofNGO's, and later
UNTAET to reach these regions was often negligible. Fretilin, with its ability to reach
areas that have traditionally been the recipients of little international assistance, enjoyed a
solid popular base within the regional Timorese population (Hohe, 2002, pp.582-585).

On top of the small electoral timeframe, the previous criticism of UNTAET's centralist
tendency also aided Fretilin, as it allowed the party to openly manipulate the political
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machinations through much ofregional Timor, where 80 percent of the population
resides (Philpott, 2006, p.149). Indeed as Tanja Hohe asserts, for many of the Timorese,
UNTAET did not exist or had no recognisable representation; the Fretilin party and its
representatives were the only symbols of the Timorese political system (Hohe, 2002, p.
183).

In addition to this, Fretilin took large freedoms in their campaign approaches, often
referring to their opponents in a derogatory and insulting manner. Anthony L. Smith
(2004, p.151) details how "Fretilin spokespeople regularly talked of dasa rai (sweeping
the ground clean)- a phrase notoriously associated with the genocidal actions of the
Indonesian army in the 1970s - in order to describe what the party planned to do to its
opponents". When the UN chartered Independent Electoral Mediation Panel issued a
statement against such forms of "verbal harassment", future Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri
publicly accused the panel of attempting to assist other parties in their attempts to defeat
Fretilin, and any more serious action was withheld (Smith, 2004, p.151 ).

During stages of the short election campaign Alkatiri and other Fretilin spokespersons
repeatedly predicted the party could poll as much as eighty percent of the vote
(Shoesmith, 2003, p. 242). The election results were, however, a surprise as Fretilin
failed to gain their much talked about "supermajority" and finished with only a majority
of 57.4 percent (Smith, 2004, p151). There are several reasons for Fretilin's smaller than
expected vote count, including the unexpected popularity of prominent Timorese from
both during and before the Indonesian occupation who chose to oppose Fretilin, the
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exceeding arrogance of the Fretilin campaign rhetoric, and finally, and perhaps most
importantly, the increasing hostility towards the party from the then presidential
candidate Gusmao (Shoesmith, 2003, pp. 232-240).

Francisco Xavier do Amaral, the former President of East Tim or during the Indonesian
invasion in 1975, had revived his political fortunes with the Timorese Social Democratic
Association (ADST), and had led the party to almost 8 percent of the vote. The six seats
that had resulted from these would otherwise have gone Fretilin's way, but these gains
became inconsequential as Xavier do Amaral quickly forged an alliance with the ruling
party, ensuring that Fretilin gained the seats it needed to proceed with its constitutional
reforms. While the spectrum of parties that polled votes in the election proved a
revelation for observers, and a concern for Alkatiri and his newly formed cabinet, it did
little to change the East Timorese political landscape (Smith, 2004, p. 151 ).

Despite the fact that Fretilin failed to gain the massive majority that it had confidently
predicted, the fact that it still garnered almost 50 percent more of the vote than any other
party shows the extent to which Fretilin had become entrenched within the population of
East Timor. While there has been rising resistance to Fretilin's dominance and increasing
arrogance, the party has continued to regard itself as the only legitimate force within East
Timor, and in turn remains the only recognisable form of political authority to a
population that remained largely untouched by the UN operation (Neumann, 2006, p. 16).
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Despite the lack of literature available on the recent events, the violence in 2006 also
highlighted another failing of nation building in East Timor, in that UNT AET failed to
address issues of ethnicity during the three year intervention. Issues of violence between
groups were largely defined by UNTAET as having political rather than ethnic
dimensions. However, accusations of ethnic discrimination have been at the forefront of
unrest within Timor during the last months (Kearney, 2006). 23

The crisis in 2006 arose largely from a dispute within the military over the discrimination
of six hundred troops who were from the Loromonu, or western, ethnic group. While
there was little attention paid to such tensions by the UN during the years leading up to
2006, there were concerns expressed by several observers and former UNTAET staffers
over the potential for ethnicity to become an issue. Anthony L. Smith (2004, pp. 157)
argued that although "ethnolinguistic distinctions, happily, are neither very stark nor very
salient politically" (as of 2004), there was a potential for such tensions to factionalise the
Timorese, especially among the political elite.

Simon Philpott's examination in early 2006 (before the crisis had eventuated) presented a
similar situation, but one in which the Smith's potential factionalism had become a
reality. Philpott (2006, pp.151-152) argued that the military, who are responsible directly
to President Gusmao, suffer from poorer "pay, conditions and equipment" than their
counterparts in the police force, who are under the direction of the elected Fretilin
government. Moreover, Philpott (2006, p.151) argued that issues of ethnic tension were
23 Issues of ethnic violence and tension are not addressed in UNT AET documents during
the intervention, or in subsequent missions. Reports often referred to such instances
instead as being of political or social origin.
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on the rise during late 2005 as the ill-treated armed forces were recruited heavily from the
eastern regions, areas historically associated with the Falintil and also seen as Gusmao's
powerbase. This, ironically, resulted in those troops who did not associate themselves
with Gusmao suffering, as what little resources and opportunities for promotion that did
exist were kept for those loyal to the President, leaving the remainder of the troops in
even worse conditions.

Therefore, in this instance the tensions that Smith was concerned could factionalise the
political elite in Timor did indeed come about through the favouritism shown to the
Fretilin controlled police force over the Gusmao-loyal military. This provided the spark
that both Philpott and Smith predicted could be used to incite dormant ethnic and regional
tensions, as was evident within the military in early 2006. Those troops recruited from the
western regions of Timor felt that they were discriminated against by their commanders
and other soldiers from the eastern regions, yet this discrimination was increasingly
exacerbated by the fact that the military had little resources to begin with. This resulted in
the effects of such ethnic discrimination being compounded, and forced a breaking point
that ignited the crisis that would follow in the subsequent months of 2006.

After taking their accusations to President Gusmao, the troops returned to their barracks,
where they subsequently deserted. Refusing to return to duty in the face of threats of
action against them if they continued their protest, the s.oldiers were consequently
discharged from the military by then Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri. This was despite such
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an action raising issues of whether the government even had jurisdiction in this matter
(Neumann, 2006, p.16).

The dismissed soldiers revolted, leading to clashes between the rebels and their civilian
supporters, who were largely unemployed youths of Loromonu origin, and the remaining
military and police force loyal to the government (Barker, 2006; Dodd, 2006). The
violence that erupted in East Timor, centralised within the capital Dili, has led to the
forced evacuation of 130,000 civilians, and finally forced Alkatiri to resign on the 26th of
June (Barker, 2006). The unrest has continued throughout 2006, despite the ascension to
Prime Minister of the popular Jose Ramos Horta and the deployment of an Australian led
peacekeeping force (Horta, 2006).

As was outlined in chapter one, there are arguments put forward by authors such as
Lothar Brock (2001, pp.1-2) and Walker Connor asserting that nation building
interventions fail to address, or at least play down, the importance of ethnicity within
such operations (Connor cited in Brock, 2001, p.1 ). That the UNT AET intervention also
failed to address such issues in Timor has only become obvious to the international
community during the past months of unrest. However, such tensions are hardly of recent
origin, with such ethnic divisions dating back to the first years of the Indonesian
occupation (Da Silva, 2006; Donnan, 2006).

These tensions were exacerbated by continuing concerns about the security forces that
were charged with providing stability now that the majority of the peacekeeping troops
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had withdrawn. An examination of the UNMISET reports from 2002 through to 2005
shows a continual concern over the ability and reliability of the Timorese police and
military, but seemed to have little effect on plans by the UN Security Council to
withdraw troops and scale down the operation by mid 2005 (UNMISET, 2003, pp.5-7;
UNMISET, 2004, pp. 5-17; UNMISET, 2005, pp.7-9; Security Council Resolution,
2005). This represents a continual trend after 2002 of the greater UN apparatus,
especially the Security Council, ignoring concerns that had been raised by both the
UNMISET and UNOTIL missions over security and judicial processes within Timor.

While the reports were far more optimistic than corresponding examinations, they did
repeatedly call for a longer term mandate for the UN missions in Timor in order to ensure
that the country could maintain stability. As late as May 2005 a mission report contained
a warning "that the withdrawal of the last United Nations formed troops from Timor
Leste may have a negative impact on the overall security situation in the country", and
called for the continued deployment of a small international force (UNMISET, 2005,
p.9). This request was not granted by the UN, leaving only civilian observers and
advisors in Timor after (2005 UNMISET, 2005, p.9); Security Council Resolution, 2005).

The final argument of this chapter is therefore that the UN withdrew from Tim or
prematurely, leaving the population with a parliament dominated by a single party,
security and police forces that were still in their infancy, and having ignored issues of
ethnicity that had the potential to create unrest and division with fledgling institutions
such as the military and police. That there was little attention paid to such issues during
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both UNTAET and its successor missions, emphasises points made within nation
building literature that suggests there is a failure by such interventions to adapt to local
issues. Operations tend to heavily rely on previous experiences and a standard
methodological approach that is to be adapted to all circumstances, and successes are
defined within universal criteria of elections and independence rather than by defining
what is required within each specialised operation.

As lauded as the independence of East Timor was in 2002, the events of the subsequent
four years, and especially the months of February to July 2006, have shown that it came
too soon. This premature handover has resulted in East Timor being at the mercy of
international funding and aid programs for the foreseeable future. It risks becoming an
increasing strain on the UN and major NGO"s such as the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund; a strain that could have been avoided if the UNTAET operation had
served a sufficient "tour of duty". As Joshua Kurlantzick (2006, p.1) asserts, Timor has
become "the UN success story that wasn't", and it will continue not to be at least in the
short term.
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CONCLUSION

The aim of this thesis has been to provide a limited examination of a form of
reconstruction that has been defined in several different ways, but has been referred to as
"nation building" during this paper. As a thorough examination of nation building
operations throughout the modern period would have been impossible within the time and
word restrictions placed on this thesis, a case study of a single nation building operation
was undertaken. A case study, while still limited by these constraints, allows for greater
depth in the examination of the phases of a nation building operation. East Timor was
chosen as the subject of this case study as it was a recent operation, was of particular
relevance to Australia, and was regarded as a successful intervention.

However, the direction of the thesis changed with the crisis that occurred in 2006 that
began with allegations of ethnic discrimination within the military and police force, and
finally forced the resignation of Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri. While the initial research
for this thesis had shown that the success of the operation had been exaggerated to an
extent, the fallout of the events during 2006 was hard to comprehend more than four
years after the operation's conclusion. The inability of the ruling Fretilin Government to
deal with the crisis highlighted that the much publicised stability and strength of the
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political systems and institutions in Timor had been overstated, and this made an
assessment of the UNTAET nation building operation even more significant.

While the crisis of 2006 necessitated that the thesis take a more negative view of the
nation building operation in Timor, this outlook was reinforced by the literature that had
been devoted to the intervention from early 2000, with substantial portions of this being
produced by former members of the UNTAET intervention24 . Criticisms of the
intervention ranged from the small timeframe and lack of initial planning to the failure of
the transitional administration to ensure Timorese participation in the reconstruction
process.

The conclusion to the research of this paper presents the following findings. The initial
phase of the operation was successful. Following the violence that erupted after the 1999
referendum, the international community came together quickly to ensure that
peacekeepers were deployed to the troubled region in a substantial number in a matter of
weeks. This peacekeeping force, INTERFET, moved swiftly to stabilise the region,
having secured the majority of the Timorese region by the beginning of 2000. Thus, a
stable and secure environment was in place, protected by several thousand peacekeepers,
to allow the next phase of nation building to take place.

Jarat Chopra was head of district administrations for UNT AET from October 2000 to
March 2001. Anthony Goldstone was a senior political affairs officer on the three U.N.
missions in East Timor. Dennis Shoesmith acted as an occasional consultant in East Timor
during 2000-2001. Jonathan Steele acted as a consultant in East Timor during 2001.
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This next phase, institution building, was far less successful. Issues specific to the
Timorese operation arose. The violence of 1999 had left much of Timor in ruins and
would force the operation to essentially create, rather than rebuild, important institutions.
A lack of Timorese expertise in many areas of business and governance would force the
operation to bring in external advisors to carry out integral portions of the reconstruction
process. Such local issues were also exacerbated by failures that have become
characteristics of many nation building operations, namely centralisation and a reluctance
to include local participation.

A tendency towards centralising power and authority prevented the UNTAET operation
from reaching a majority of the Timorese population, meaning that the successes that did
occur benefited only a minority. A reluctance to involve the Timorese in the
reconstruction process was drawn mainly from the lack of expertise that existed within
the population, yet resulted only in ensuring that the Timorese remained largely incapable
of taking over the reconstruction process once the international contingent withdrew.

While institution building did take place within East Timor, it did not occur at the depth
that was promoted in the various UN mission reports that were examined. Indeed, many
of the documents were misleading, promoting the overall success of the operation while
at the same time detailing the many challenges that were being faced in integral areas of
the institution building process. It is unclear what the aim behind this was. Possibly the
operation was fearful of becoming trapped in a long term intervention with no chance of
withdrawal. However, the result is a series of contradictory documents that provide
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insight into an operation that was torn between conflicting goals. UNT AET' s mandate
called for a nation building process that would require significant resources and a long
term commitment, yet the UN Security Council and the international community were
determined that a quick withdrawal was a priority.

Where the building of institutions in Timor was only partially successful at best, the
events of 2006 have shown that the movement towards elections and an operational
withdrawal was one of unmitigated failure. The elections held in 2001 were held
prematurely, preventing the formation of a significant multi-party democracy and
effectively securing the Fretilin Party as a dominant long term government. With the
elections usurping the initial UNTAET mandate as the measure of the operation's
success, the withdrawal of the majority of the international forces soon took place,
leaving the majority of the reconstruction process unfinished, and therefore, the Timorese
people with essentially a failed state.

The Fretilin Government, having essentially been handed power by the manner in which
their dominance in Timor was acceded to by the international community, went virtually
unopposed except for resistance from the Timorese President Xanana Gusmao. Yet it was
this tension that arose between the government and the President that led to the important
institutions such as the FDTL and the PNTL becoming politicised. These institutions,
whose own construction and development were themselves at issue throughout the
entirety of the reconstruction, proved unable to cope with the pressure of such a conflict.
Their failure did, however, assist in highlighting the fact that the withdrawal of
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international forces was premature, and were symptoms of a widespread fragility and
weakness throughout many of Timor's fledgling institutions, in particular public
administration, civil governance, the judiciary and agriculture.

The nation building operation in Tim or may yet be saved, but as of 2006 it remains on the
brink of failure. The fact that peacekeeping forces are again providing security to the
troubled state effectively signals that that the operation has come full circle, and must
start over. However, the intervention's failure does provide insight into the concept of
nation building as a whole. It was argued early in this paper that nation building was
ambiguous in that it presented a structure for such operations only at the most superficial
of levels. This has proven to be true, in that the many challenges and difficulties that the
UNTAET mission and its successors faced in East Timor were hardly able to be foreseen
by an examination of the nation building literature available.

The initial phase of the nation building process was, it is conceded, successful. However,
this should come as no surprise. The intervention of an overwhelming military force is
an appropriate measure to ensure that stability is achieved, and such peacekeeping
missions are scattered throughout the mid to late 20th Century, allowing for sufficient
institutional knowledge to precede the operation. Yet, while overwhelming force is an
adequate solution to lawlessness and violence, recent operations have highlighted the
inadequacy of such an option in the long term.
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Where the stabilising phase of the operation at least enjoys an effective, if crude, method
of success, the institution building phase enjoys no such option. So many interventions
have failed at this stage that there is little consensus on any strategy for success that
extends further than the simple "reconstruction of institutions". In its examination, the
case study of East Timor can provide some limited insight into this phase. Perhaps the
most obvious is that this part of the operation requires long term commitment of both
manpower and resources, and that a premature withdrawal will likely only result in the
intervening forces having to repeat the reconstruction at some point in the future. Local
issues vary so greatly between operations that past experience can count for very little.
However, it is noted that issues of centralisation, and a reluctance to include the local
population in the reconstruction process, do find a common theme among many nation
building operations.

Finally, the withdrawal phase of a nation building operation, rarely even mentioned by
literature in this subject field, has been shown in this case study to be of increasing
importance. This is especially so when that withdrawal comes prematurely, leaving weak
institutions incapable of coping with issues such as ethnic tensions and crises of
governance that occur in such unstable environs.

Such a finding becomes the conclusion of both the case study of the East Timorese
operation, and the limited examination it allows of such nation building operations as a
whole. A premature withdrawal, before the construction of its institutions has been
completed, will result in a state that has little regard for such institutions, especially the
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complex ideals ofresponsible governance and judicial process. The result is a breeding
ground for tensions that arise over such issues as ethnic, political, and religious
differences, in which a dominant group will eventually assume power, often at the
terrible expense of the rest of the population.
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APPENDICES

The three appendices on the following pages are publications released by either the UN
or UNTAET. The initial two documents should be noted for their promotion of the
UNTAET operation and its successes through to the intervention's conclusion in 2002.
The final two documents are UN Security Council resolutions; one is the initial resolution
on UNTAET's mandate, the second details the final withdrawal ofUNMISET in 2005.

1. UNTAET Press Office Fact Sheet 1: UNTAET's 25 Major Achievements [April
2002).
2. UNTAET Press Office Fact Sheet 20: UNTAET Downsizing (April 2002).
3. UN Security Council Resolution 1272 [1999).
4. UN Security Council Resolution 1599 [2005).
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April 2002

By UNTAET Press Office

UNTAET'S 25 MAJOR ACHIEVEMENTS
The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established
by the Security Council in October 1999. Here are 25 of the major achievements UNTAET
and all its partners have made possible since that time.
•

The establishment of peace and security in East Timor (Fact Sheets 6 and 17).

•

The addressing of humanitarian needs by UNHCR, IOM, WFP and UNICEF, which
were all instrumental, together with UNTAET, in ensuring that humanitarian needs
were met quickly after the violence of 1999. Over 200,000 refugees, one-quarter of the
population, have since returned to East Timor (Fact Sheet 9).

•

The holding of free, fair and completely peaceful elections on 30 August 2001 that
resulted in an 88-member Constituent Assembly that drafted and approved East
Timor's first Constitution (Fact Sheet 4).

•

The creation of the Second Transitional Government and appointment of the fully
Timorese Council of Ministers (Fact Sheet 3) now running the day-to-day activities of
the G>vernment. The Council, appointed on 20 September 2001, replaced the
Transitional Cabinet created in July 2000 (which consisted of four East Timorese
members and four UNTAET representatives).

•

The holding of free, fair and completely peaceful presidential elections on 14 April
2002 that resulted in the election of independence leader Xanana Gusmao as East
Timor's first president (Fact Sheet 5).

•

The establishment of a Timorese-led national programme of civic education which
trained over 5,500 community leaders and directly involved over 100,000 East
Timorese.

•

The holding of 200 Constitutional Public Hearings in June and July 2001 at which
38,000 East Timorese turned out to air their views on what should be considered by the
Constituent Assembly when drafting tl1e first Constitution.

•

The registration of 742,461 people, virtually the entire population currently living in
East Timor (excluding tl1e refugees in West Timor), over a three-month period in 2001.
This data fonned the basis for preparations for the Comtituent Assembly and
Presidential elections.

•

The normalization of relations with Indonesia that has resulted in high-level
bilateral meetings, and the trialateral talks involving Indonesia and Australia in
February and subsequent working level meetings with fudonesian officials on a wide
range of issues. Twelve countries and the European Unionhave established
Representative Offices in East Timor.
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•

The creation of the East Timor Defence Force (ETDF), with 600 soldiers having
been recruited and undergone basic training to form the ETDF's first battalion. A
group of 261 yom1g recruits - including 30 women - have now been recruited and after
basic training will form the first component of the ETDF's second battalion.
(Fact Sheet 16)

•

The establishment of the East Timor Police Service, with more than 1,697 East
Timorese Police Officers having graduated from the Police College in Dili and been
deployed in all 13 districts (Fact Sheet 6).

•

The establishment of a Civil Service. To date, approximately 11,000 East Timorese
civil servants have been recruited (Fact Sheet 12).

•

The establishment of a functioning judicial and legal system, includi11g an East
Timorese Prosecutor General's Office and a Defender Service; four District Courts; a
Court of Appeals, and prisons in Dill, Baucau and Ennera (Fact Sheet 7).

•

The creation of a Commission on Reception, Truth and Reconciliation that will seek
the truth regarding human rights violations in East Tinlor within the context of the political
conflicts between 25 Aprll 1974 and 25 October 1999; facilitate community
reconciliation by dealing with past cases of lesser c1imes, and ultiniately report on its
findings and make recommendations to the government for further action on
reconciliation and the promotion of human rights (Fact Sheet 8).

III

•

III

III

•

The creation of the first ever functioning Gender Affairs Unit in a Peacekeeping
Mission, which has focused on raising awareness on promoting gender equality in
policies and legislation of the East Tinlor Transitional Administration. Specific gender
orientation sessions have also been conducted for the Peacekeeping Force, Civilian
Police and East Tinlor Police Service, on cultural awareness of gender roles and the
different impact of conflict and post-conflict reconstruction on the women and tren of
East Tinlor. Twenty-four per cent of Legislative Assembly seats are held by
women - which is the second highest average in the Asia-Pacific region.
The basic rehabilitation of schools throughout the country. More than 700 primary
schools, 100 junior secondary schools, 40 pre-schools and 10 technical colleges are
now teaching approximately 240,000 children and older students (Fact Sheet 14).
The reconstruction of 32 major public buildings by the East Tinlor Transitional
Administration. Seven major buildings are currently under reconstruction, two in the
capital Dili and five in Baucau, Ermera, Liqui9a and Oecussi districts (Fact Sheet 13).
The initialization of an agreement with Australia on oil and gas reserves, the Timor
Sea Arrangement; commencing in 2004, this has the potential to provide East Tinlor
with billions in revenue over the following 20 years (Fact Sheet 18).
The creation of Radio UNTAET, whose coverage extends to all of East Tinlor and
some refugee camps in West Timor, and TVTL, whose broadcasts are seen in Dili and
Baucau with highlights shown at public gatherings in other districts (Fact Sheet 19) .
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•

Basic public services have been put in place in a wide range of areas including health,
education and infrastructure. Electricity has been re-established and clear water is
being provided in urban areas following the widespread destruction of these facilities
in 1999 (Fact Sheets 13, 14 and 15).

•

The initiation of a major road rehabilitation programme, focusing on the repair and
maintenance of a 1,000-kilometer core road network neglected for more than two
decades. The Dili Port is busy with shipping. The Dili international airport was
reopened for commercial flights in early 2000. Now under civilian administration, it
handles international flights by five carriers.

•

The early formation of a Central Fiscal Authority, the precursor to the current
Ministzy of Finance, to ensure that East Timor's limited resources are used effectively
and that the countzy has a stable fiscal framework for a sustainable economy.

•

The establishment of a Banking and Payments Authority (initially called the Central
Payments Office) that functions as the proto-Central Bank. This institution has
developed and manages correspondent banking facilities with foreign and central
commercial banks, and manages the government.payroll.

•

The establishment of a Small Enterprises Project to help restart viable economic
activities in the private sector. This has helped create an entrepreneurial class while
generating employment in urban areas.

•

The rehabilitation of two-thirds of the arable land; the restoration of livestock by
importing and vaccinating cattle and buffalo; and the provision of nets and boats to
small fishing enterprises to tap the rich potential of East Timor's waters.
The above developments were achieved with the active assistance of donor countries, World Bank,
UN Agencies, NGOs and many other partners.

•
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UNTAET DOWNSIZING
•

The United Nations Security Council on 31 October 2001 endorsed SeeretaryGeneral Kofi Annan'srecommendations that the UN continue its role in East
Timor after the territory's independence. The 15-me•nber body also backed the
recommendation of East Timor's Constituent Assembly that independence be
declared on 20 May 2002. The UN Security Com1cil reaffirmed its endorsement
on 31 January 2002, and is expected to undertake a final consideration of the
UNTAET mandate in the second half of April 2002.
All reductions are being implemented in a phased manner to minimize the
negative effect on the delivery of basic government services and on the local
economy, as well as to ensure that the job of establishing a sustainable
administration is advanced.
The Secretary-General reported on 17 January 2002 that, "steady progress has
been made in the adjustment of UNTAET' s size and configuration to reflect more
closely the post-independence role of the United Nations, as endorsed by the
Security Counci [on 31 October 2001]."
Accordingly, civilian UNTAET personnel advising the Transitional
Government were reduced by 35 percent by September 2001, and have been
reduced in a second tranche of downsizing which started in January 2002.
Progressively over a four -month period to the end of April 2002, over 3 80
positions will have been cut, leaving 25 percent of the original establishment in
place by independence.

In light of the continued prevailing stable security conditions in East Timor,
UNTAET began redu:iing its military component i.t1 mid-November 2001. The
current authorized strength of nearly 8,950 peacekeeping troops and military
observers has been reduced to 6,000, deployed personnel and will be drawn down
to 5,000 by independence.
Similarly, the United Nations Police, with an authorized strength of 1,640, have
been reduced to close to the target of 1,130 by independence. This figure includes
the United Nations Special Police Units in East Timor, which are expected to
withdraw by 1 July 2002.

In <btober, the Security Council agreed with the Secretazy,General's assessment
thatthe UN should remain engaged in East Timor to consolidate UNTAET's
major achievements so far, to build on those accomplishments and to help the East
Timorese government in ensuring security and stability.
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL
S/RES/1272 (1999)
25 October 1999

RESOLUTION 1272 (1999)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4057th meeting,
on 25 October 1999
The Security Council,
Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements
the situation in East Timor, in particular resolutions 384
22 December 1975, 399 {1976) of 22 April 1976, 1236 (1999)
1246 (1999) of 11 June 1999, 1262 (1999) of 27 August 1999
15 September 1999,

of its President on
(1975) of
of 7 May 1999,
and 1264 (1999) of

Recalling also the Agreement between Indonesia and Portugal on the question
of East Timor of 5 May 1999 and the Agreements between the United Nations and
the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal of the same date regarding the
modalities for the popular consultation of the East Timorese through a direct
ballot and security arrangements (S/1999/513, annexes I to III),
Reiterating its welcome for the successful conduct of the popular
consultation of the East Timorese people of 30 August 1999, and taking note of
its outcome through which the East Timorese people expressed their clear wish to
begin a process of transition under the authority of the United Nations towards
independence, which it regards as an accurate reflection of the views of the
East Timorese people,
Welcoming the decision of the Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly on
19 October 1999 concerning East Timer,
Stressing the importance of reconciliation among the East Timorese people,
Commending the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) for the
admirable courage and determination shown in the implementation of its mandate,
Welcoming the deployment of a multinational force to East Timor pursuant to
resolution 1264 (1999), and recognizing the importance of continued cooperation
between the Government of Indonesia and the multinational force in this regard,
Noting the report of the Secretary-General of 4 October 1999 (S/1999/1024),
99-31277 (E)
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Noting with satisfaction the successful outcome of the trilateral meeting
held on 28 September 1999, as outlined in the report of the Secretary-General,
Deeply concerned by the grave humanitarian situation resulting from
violence in East Timar and the large-scale displacement and relocation of East
Timorese civilians, including large numbers of women and children,
Reaffirming the need for all parties to ensure that the rights of refugees
and displaced persons are protected, and that they are able to return
voluntarily in safety and security to their homes,
Reaffirming respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Indonesia,
Noting the importance of ensuring the security of the boundaries of
East Timar, and noting in this regard the expressed intention of the Indonesian
authorities to cooperate with the multinational force deployed pursuant to
resolution 1264 (1999) and with the United Nations Transitional Administration
in East Timar,
Expressing its concern at reports indicating that systematic, widespread
and flagrant violations of international humanitarian and human rights law have
been committed in East Timar, stressing that persons committing such violations
bear individual responsibility, and calling on all parties to cooperate with
investigations into these reports,
Recallinq the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety
of United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994,
Determininq that the continuing situation in East Timar constitutes a
threat to peace and security,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1.
Decides to establish, in accordance with the report of the SecretaryGeneral, a United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timar (UNTAET),
which will be endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of East
Timar and will be empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority,
including the administration of justice;
2.
Decides also that the mandate of UNTAET shall consist of the following
elements:
(a) To provide security and maintain law and order throughout the
territory of East Timar;
(b)

To establish an effective administration;

(c)

To assist in the development of civil and social services;

(d) To ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance,
rehabilitation and development assistance;
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(e)

To support capacity-building for self-government;

(f) To assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable
development;
3.
Decides further that UNTAET will have objectives and a structure along
the lines set out in part IV of the report of the Secretary-General, and in
particular that its main components will be:
(a) A governance and public administration component, including an
international police element with a strength of up to 1,640 officers;
(b)

A humanitarian assistance and emergency rehabilitation component;

(c) A military component, with a strength of up to 8,950 troops and up to
200 military observers;
4.
mandate;

Authorizes UNTAET to take all necessary measures to fulfil its

5.
Recognizes that, in developing and performing its functions under its
mandate, UNTAET will need to draw on the expertise and capacity of Member
States, United Nations agencies and other international organizations, including
the international financial institutions;
6.
Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint a Special
Representative who, as the Transitional Administrator, will be responsible for
all aspects of the United Nations work in East Timer and will have the power to
enact new laws and regulations and to amend, suspend or repeal existing ones;
7.
Stresses the importance of cooperation between Indonesia, Portugal and
UNTAET in the implementation of this resolution;
8.
Stresses the need for UNTAET to consult and cooperate closely with the
East Timorese people in order to carry out its mandate effectively with a view
to the development of local democratic institutions, including an independent
East Timorese human rights institution, and the transfer to these institutions
of its administrative and public service functions;
9.
Requests UNTAET and the multinational force deployed pursuant to
resolution 1264 (1999) to cooperate closely with each other, with a view also to
the replacement as soon as possible of the multinational force by the military
component of UNTAET, as notified by the Secretary-General having consulted the
leadership of the multinational force, taking into account conditions on the
ground;
10. Reiterates the urgent need for coordinated humanitarian and
reconstruction assistance, and calls upon all parties to cooperate with
humanitarian and human rights organizations so as to ensure their safety, the
protection of civilians, in particular children, the safe return of refugees and
displaced persons and the effective delivery of humanitarian aid;
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11. Welcomes the commitment of the Indonesian authorities to allow the
refugees and displaced persons in West Timor and elsewhere in Indonesia to
choose whether to return to East Timor, remain where they are or be resettled in
other parts of Indonesia, and stresses the importance of allowing full, safe and
unimpeded access by humanitarian organizations in carrying out their work;
12. Stresses that it is the responsibility of the Indonesian authorities
to take immediate and effective measures to ensure the safe return of refugees
in West Timor and other parts of Indonesia to East Timor, the security of
refugees, and the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and
settlements, in particular by curbing the violent and intimidatory activities of
the militias there;
13. Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to establish a Trust
Fund available for, inter alia, the rehabilitation of essential infrastructure,
including the building of basic institutions, the functioning of public services
and utilities, and the salaries of local civil servants;
14. Encouraqes Member States and international agencies and organizations
to provide personnel, equipment and other resources to UNTAET as requested by
the Secretary-General, including for the building of basic institutions and
capacity, and stresses the need for the closest possible coordination of these
efforts;
15. Underlines the importance of including in UNTAET personnel with
appropriate training in international humanitarian, human rights and refugee
law, including child and gender-related provisions, negotiation and
communication skills, cultural awareness and civilian-military coordination;
16. Condemns all violence and acts in support of violence in East Timor,
calls for their immediate end, and demands that those responsible for such
violence be brought to justice;
17. Decides to establish UNTAET for an initial period until
31 January 2001;
18. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council closely and
regularly informed of progress towards the implementation of this resolution,
including, in particular, with regard to the deployment of UNTAET and possible
future reductions of its military component if the situation in East Timor
improves, and to submit a report within three months of the date of adoption of
this resolution and every six months thereafter;
19.

Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

United Nations

Security Council

S/RES/1599 (2005)
Distr. : General
28 April 2005

Resolution 1599 (2005)
Adopted by the Secul'ity Council at its 5171st meeting,
on 28 April 2005
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its previous resolutions on the situation in Timor-Leste, in
particular its resolutions 1543 (2004) of 14 May 2004 and 1573 (2004) of
16 November 2004,
Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 18 February 2005
(S/2005/99),
Commending the people and the Government of Timor-Leste for the peace and
stability they have achieved in the country, as well as for their continuing efforts
towards consolidating democracy and strengthening State institutions,
Further commending the United Nations Mission of Support in Timor-Leste
(UNMISET), under the leadership of the Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral, and welcoming the continuing progress made towards the completion of
key tasks inscribed in its mandate, particularly during its consolidation phase, in
accordance with Security Council resolutions 1543 (2004) and 1573 (2004),
Paying tribute to Timor-Leste's bilateral and multilateral partners for their
invaluable assistance, particularly with regard to institutional capacity-building and
social and economic development,
Expressing its appreciation to those Member States which have provided
support to UNMISET,
Having considered the letter dated 20 January 2005, from the Prime Minister
of Timor-Leste to the Secretary-General (S/2005/103),
Noting the Secretary-General's analysis of the need for a United Nations
presence to remain in Timor-Leste after 20 May 2005, although at a reduced level,
Noting also that the emerging institutions in Timor-Leste are still in the
process of consolidation and that further assistance is required to ensure sustained
development and strengthening of key sectors, mainly rule of law, including justice,
human rights, and support for the Timor-Leste police, and other public
administration,

05-32631 (E)

*0532631*
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Acknowledging the excellent communication and good will that have
characterized relations between Timor-Leste and Indonesia including the decision to
establish a Truth and Friendship Commission, and their land border agreement
signed in Dili 8 April 2005, which covers approximately 96 per cent of the land
border, and encouraging continued efforts by both Governments towards resolving
this and all pending bilateral issues,
Acknowledging the Secretary-General's decision outlined in his letter to the
Security Council dated 11 January 2005 (S/2005/96) to send a Commission of
Experts to Timor-Leste and Indonesia to review the serious crimes accountability
processes, and recommend further measures as appropriate,
Remaining fidly committed to the promotion of long-lasting stability in TimorLeste,

1.
Decides to establish a one-year follow-on special political mission in
Timor-Leste, the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), which will
remain in Timor-Leste until 20 May 2006;
2.

Decides fi1rther that UNOTIL will have the following mandate:

(i) to support the development of critical State institutions through provision
of up to 45 civilian advisers;
(ii) to support further development of the police through provision of up to
40 police advisers, and support for development of the Border Patrol Unit
(BPU), through provision of up to 3 5 additional advisers, 15 of whom may be
military advisers;
(iii) to provide training in observance of democratic governance and human
rights through provision of up to 10 human rights officers; and
(iv) to monitor and review progress in (i) through (iii) above;
3.
Requests that, when implementing its mandate, UNOTIL emphasize
proper transfer of skills and knowledge in order to build the capacity of the public
institutions of Timor-Leste to deliver their services in accordance with international
principles of rule of law, justice, human rights, democratic governance,
transparency, accountability and professionalism;
4.
Requests further that UNOTIL be led by a Special Representative of the
Secretary-General, who will direct the operations of the mission and coordinate all
United Nations activities in Timor-Leste through his office, with due attention to
safety of personnel, and facilitated by appropriate levels of logistics support,
including transportation assets, such as air transport when necessary;
5.
Requests that the Secretary-General deploy some of the advisers,
authorized in paragraph 2 (ii) above, to assist the National Police of Timor-Leste in
developing procedures for and in training the Border Patrol Unit (BPU) and to assist
the Timor-Leste Government in coordinating contacts with the Indonesian military,
with the objective of transferring skills to the BPU to assume full responsibility for
such coordination as soon as possible;
Underlines that United Nations assistance to Timor-Leste should be
6.
coordinated with the efforts of bilateral and multilateral donors, regional
mechanisms, non-governmental organizations, private sector organizations and other
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actors from within the international community, and encourages the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General to establish and chair a consultative group,
made up of these stakeholders in Timor-Leste, that will meet regularly for that
purpose;
Urges the donor community as well as the United Nations agencies and
7.
multilateral financial institutions to continue providing resources and assistance for
the implementation of projects towards sustainable and long-term development in
Timor-Leste, and urges the donor community to actively participate in the donor's
conference scheduled to be held in April 2005;

8.
Encourages, in particular, the Government of Timor-Leste, UNOTIL, the
United Nations Secretariat, United Nations development and humanitarian agencies,
and multilateral financial institutions to start immediately planning for a smooth and
rapid transition, in Timor-Leste, from a special political mission to a sustainable
development assistance framework;
9.
Reaffirms the need for credible accountability for the serious human
rights violations committed in East Timor in 1999, and, in this regard, underlines the
need for the United Nations Secretariat, in agreement with Timor-Leste authorities,
to preserve a complete copy of all the records compiled by the Serious Crimes Unit,
calls on all parties to cooperate fully with the work of the Secretary-General's
Commission of Experts, and looks forward to the Commission's upcoming report
exploring possible ways to address this issue, including ways of assisting the Truth
and Friendship Commission, which Indonesia and Timor-Leste have agreed to
establish;
10. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council closely and regularly
informed of developments on the ground and of the implementation of the mandate
of UNOTIL, and the planning for a transition to a sustainable development
assistance framework, and to submit a report within four months of the date of
adoption of the present resolution and every four months thereafter, with
recommendations for any modifications such progress might allow to size,
composition, mandate and duration of the UNOTIL presence;
11.

Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
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